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ABSTRACT 
The tactic of leadership decapitation, using military action to capture or kill 
terrorist leadership, is a key component of United States counterterrorism strategy. 
Policymakers argue that eliminating terrorist leadership is an effective way to disrupt, 
and, ultimately, destroy terrorist organizations. Since 2001, hundreds of terrorist leaders 
have been captured or killed by U.S. counterterrorism operations. In spite of this, the 
spread of violent, radical jihadist groups like Al-Shabaab has expanded and grown in 
strength. This thesis analyzes the United States’ approach of leadership targeting toward 
Al-Shabaab in Somalia, and asks the research question: Under what conditions are 
leadership decapitation effective in degrading the terrorist group Al-Shabaab? This thesis 
finds that leadership decapitation operations have a limited effect in disrupting and 
preventing future acts of terrorism. It argues for a more analytical approach to leadership 
decapitation in order to improve its effectiveness. This thesis argues for leadership 
targeting principles that are likely to be effective counterterrorism strategies and lead to 
the long-term decline of the group, including basing targeting decisions on understanding 
the group’s internal dynamics, integrating decapitation operations into comprehensive 
counterterrorism strategies, and capitalizing on existing leadership divisions, which can 
be as effective as lethal military action.  
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 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 KILLING GODANE 
On September 5, 2014, the United States military officially confirmed the death of 
Ahmed Godane, Al-Shabaab’s Emir since 2008, remarking that, “removing Godane from 
the battlefield is a major symbolic and operational loss to Al-Shabaab.”1 Decapitating Al-
Shabaab’s co-founder removed a charismatic yet divisive leader that recently merged the 
group with Al-Qaeda.2 Godane’s elimination left the group exposed and vulnerable to 
fracture, leaving some analysts guessing if the most recent leadership strike signaled the 
death knell of the pressured group. According to analyst Tres Thomas, “given the 
divisive and dictatorial nature of Godane’s leadership … his death would result in an 
increasing number of defectors and bring the inevitable break-up of the group.”3 
However, more than a year after the decapitation strike little has changed. Godane’s 
successor, Abu Ubaidah, has reaffirmed his allegiance to Al-Qaeda; Al-Shabaab carried 
out a brutal attack on Kenyan Students at Garissa University College killing 147 
students4 and continues to conduct devastating raids on African Mission to Somalia 
(AMISOM) peacekeepers.5 Godane’s removal is a paradox of leadership targeting. 
During his tenure, Al-Shabaab reached the height of its territorial, administrative, 
economic, and military power. It was also under his leadership, however, that Al-Shabaab 
fell into decline, losing great swaths of territory, key sources of income, and purging Al-
Shabaab’s most experienced leadership. The death of Ahmed Godane typifies the 
                                                 
1 U.S. Department of Defense, “Statement from Pentagon Press Secretary Rear Admiral John Kirby on 
Ahmed Godane,” September 5, 2014, http://www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-
View/Article/605172. 
2 Bill Roggio and Thomas Joscelyn, “Shabaab Formally Joins Al Qaeda,” The Long War Journal, 
February 9, 2012, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/02/shabaab_formally_joi.php. 
3 Tres Thomas, “Is al-Shabaab Stronger or Weaker after Godane’s Death?” Somalia Newsroom, 
September 27, 2014, http://somalianewsroom.com/2014/09/22/analysis-is-al-shabaab-stronger-or-weaker-
after-godanesdeath/. 
4 Josh Levs and Holly Yan, “147 Dead, Islamist Gunmen Killed after attack at Kenya College,” CNN, 
April 2, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/02/africa/kenya-university-attack/. 
5 “Al-Shabaab Continues Mass Raid Tactics against AMISOM,” Somalia Newsroom, September 2, 
2015, http://somalianewsroom.com/2015/09/02/al-shabaab-continues-mass-raid-tactics-against-amisom/. 
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leadership targeting campaign against Al-Shabaab—the United States has dealt 
devastating blows to Al-Shabaab’s leadership, but nothing proved decisive enough to 
defeat the group. It is also wrought with uncertainty, with no clear answers as to who 
would succeed Godane, or whether Al-Shabaab would respond the way many analysts 
have predicted, with a splintering of the group. Moreover, would Godane’s death 
contribute to the decisive factor in leadership decapitation—organizational decline of the 
group?  
 PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze leadership decapitation theory, determine 
the systematic conditions that lead to success or failure, and apply the concept to a 
contemporary terrorist organization, Al-Shabaab in Somalia. Despite the limited 
knowledge regarding how targeting leaders can precipitate an organization’s decline, 
decapitation tactics remain a cornerstone of U.S. counterterrorism strategy. 
Understanding the characteristics of organizations that are susceptible or resilient to 
leadership decapitation is a critical step in creating effective counterterrorism policies. 
This thesis will focus on answering the following research questions: Under what 
conditions is leadership decapitation effective in disrupting or defeating Al-Shabaab in 
Somalia? Is the United States’ leadership decapitation strategy effective in weakening 
organizational capacity of Al-Shabaab? 
This thesis argues for a more analytical, dispassionate approach to leadership 
decapitation. Furthermore, this thesis will argue that the singular tactic will have little 
effect on the organizational capacity of Al-Shabaab, and must be combined with a multi-
faceted, coherent counter-terrorism strategy, proportionate with the level of threat. This 
paper will show that leadership targeting decisions are often shortsighted, ignorant of the 
environment within the conflict group and unsynchronized with the strategies they 
support. Area experts and policy analysts have thoroughly described the social and 
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political mechanisms6 that gave rise to Islamic jihadism in Somalia; therefore, it is 
beyond the scope of this paper to examine the conditions responsible for the formation 
and rise of the group. Obviously, the decline of terrorist groups is a result of multiple 
factors. This thesis focuses on just one: the campaign of leadership targeting against Al-
Shabaab in Somalia. 
 METHODOLOGY 
A brief examination of the history of terrorism in the failed state of Somalia is the 
starting point for understanding the rise of Islamic extremism and conditions that spurred 
the growth of terrorism in Somalia. The histories of Al-Qaeda East Africa (AQEA) and 
leadership targeting strategies implemented shortly after 9/11 are instructive in 
understanding the evolution of leadership targeting in Somalia, including rendition, and 
the use of drones, as a tool in the war on terror.  
This study prescribes a more robust leadership targeting doctrine based upon 
success and failures of leadership targeting. In Chapter I, I review the prevailing military, 
political and theoretical rationale for the use of leadership targeting in order to bring the 
tactics and claims of effectiveness into current context. In Chapter II, I outline the current 
U.S. policy and strategy of leadership decapitation as described in policy statements, 
speeches, and legal findings. Next, I analyze the implications the policy has on the use of 
leadership targeting in the Global War on Terror. I describe the evolution of the approach 
and how it extends to decapitation policy and strategy in the current fight against Al-
Shabaab. In Chapter III, through a detailed case study analysis, I analyze the current 
leadership targeting campaign against Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda in East Africa through 
its current life cycle. In Chapter IV, I examine why Al-Shabaab may be resilient to the 
loss of leadership by applying theories terrorist leadership and organizational stability. 
Next, I describe the factors bearing on the efficacy of leadership targeting specific to the 
Somalia jihadist context. Finally, in Chapter V, I offer recommendations on how to 
                                                 
6 For a thorough treatment of this, see Stig Hansen, Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology 
of a Militant Islamist Group, 2005–2012. New York: Columbia University Press, 2013, and Matt Bryden, 
The Decline and Fall of Al-Shabaab? Think Again. Nairobi: Sahan Research, 2015, and numerous reports 
of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea. 
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improve the prospects of leadership decapitation and alternative methods to hasten the 
group’s decline. This thesis utilizes both primary and secondary sources that examine 
policy and strategy statements from administration officials, journal articles and archives 
that detail U.S. counter-terrorism policy, strategy, and the evolution of targeted killings.  
 EXISTING LITERATURE 
The spread of transnational terrorism continues to underscore the efficacy of 
leadership targeting. Leadership decapitation is a cornerstone of the United States’ 
current counter-terrorism strategy, primarily using drone strikes and special operations 
raids. Moreover, leadership targeting against insurgents, terrorists, state leaders, and 
military commanders by the United States is not new.7 Decapitation operations against 
enemy leaders during wartime (Rommel, Yamamoto, and Hussein) and heads of state 
during limited war (Qaddafi) highlight its expected utility. The prospect of shortening 
conflicts, defeating terrorism, and effecting enemy behavior suggests that leadership 
targeting will continue to be employed as a tactic to counter transnational terrorism.  
In order to fully understand the conflicting viewpoints on the efficacy of 
leadership targeting, it is necessary to examine the existing research on the effectiveness 
of the tactic. The major theoretical basis for leadership targeting lies primarily in the 
importance of leaders to a terrorist organization.8 Terrorist organizations are often headed 
by charismatic leaders, which, by nature, are more volatile and less stable than are 
decision makers in other types of organizations.9 Terrorist leaders fulfill operational and 
inspirational roles, are able to provide tactical experience, technical expertise, and 
strategic direction. Additionally, hierarchical-based terrorist organizations and religious-
based organizations rely heavily upon leaders for guidance and ideology.  
                                                 
7 Hays W. Parks, “Memorandum of Law: Executive Order 12333 and Assassination,” The Army 
Lawyer (December 1989), 7. 
8 Michael Freeman, “A Theory of Terrorist Leadership (and its Consequences for Leadership 
Targeting),” Terrorism and Political Violence 26, no. 4 (2014): 666. 
9 Jenna Jordan, “When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation,” Security 
Studies 18, no. 4 (2009), 722. 
5 
Much has been written about the durability and resilience of terrorist and 
insurgent organizations.10 Responses to leadership targeting have led to the 
decentralization and autonomy of terrorist groups, particularly Al-Qaeda and its affiliates. 
These adaptations include decentralization and formation of smaller, leaderless networks, 
which diminish the importance of top-tier leadership. Recent empirical studies have 
examined group dynamics such as organizational structure, age, and type as important 
variables of leadership targeting.11 For example, size is also an important factor for 
determining the effectiveness of decapitation; larger groups have larger pools of 
resources and can better withstand a state’s efforts to counter them, especially through 
leadership targeting. In general, as terrorist groups age and grow in size, they become 
more resilient to leadership targeting.12  
1. The View That Leadership Decapitation Is Effective
Several studies have shown that leadership decapitation is an effective tactic 
against terrorist groups.13 Price analyzed the efficacy of leadership decapitation by 
evaluating the long-term effects of leadership decapitation by measuring the mortality 
rate of terrorist groups. Price’s findings suggest decapitation strategies may increase 
violence in the short-term, but precipitate the decline of terrorist groups in the long-
term.14 Additionally, terrorist groups’ unique organizational characteristics make them 
susceptible to leadership decapitation. These characteristics amplify the importance of 
10 Martha Crenshaw, “How Terrorism Declines,” Terrorism and Political Violence 3, no. 1, (1991): 
80. 
11 Aaron Mannes, “Testing the Snake Head Strategy: Does Killing or Capturing Its Leaders Reduce a 
Terrorist Group’s Activity?” The Journal of International Policy Solutions, vol. 9, (Spring 2008): 41; Jenna 
Jordan, “When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation,” Security Studies 18, 
no. 4 (2009): 720. 
12 Jordan, “When Heads Roll,” 744. 
13 Patrick Johnston, “Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting 
in Counterinsurgency Campaigns,” International Security 36, no. 4 (2012): 77; David Price, “Targeting 
Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to Counterterrorism.” International Security 36, 
no. 4 (April 2012): 11. 
14 Price, “Targeting Top Terrorists,” 46 
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terrorist leadership and make leadership succession especially difficult.15 In 
counterinsurgency operations, evidence suggests that, “leadership decapitation increases 
the chances of ending insurgencies, enhances the probability of campaign outcomes 
favorable to counter-insurgents, reduces the intensity of violent conflict, and shrinks the 
number of insurgent initiated attacks.”16 Johnston asserts that the elimination of leaders 
degrades capabilities and puts terrorist groups on the defensive with less resources, time, 
and expertise to plan and conduct terrorist operations.17 Leadership targeting may have 
deterrent effects as well. Advocates claim that leadership targeting deters terrorist 
organizations from carrying out operations against the state. Leadership targeting can 
bring terrorist groups under moderate control, and targeting high-level political leaders 
can bring organizations to the bargaining table.18 In fact, leaders that are captured 
occasionally abandon the tactic of terrorism and encourage supporters to surrender.19  
Capturing targeted leaders can have similar “lethal” effects that contribute to the 
decline of terrorist organizations.20 While capturing a leader is not always possible and 
arguably much riskier, it may be more beneficial than killing.21 Cronin also argues that 
                                                 
15 David Price, “Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to 
Counterterrorism,” International Security 36, no. 4 (April 2012): 11. These are the propensity for violence, 
clandestine operational nature, and values-based organizations. 
16 Patrick Johnston, “Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting 
in Counterinsurgency Campaigns, “International Security 36, no. 4 (2012), 77. Author also contends that 
counterinsurgency (COIN) operations are more successful where leaders are decapitated than those that are 
not, regardless of group objectives or ideology.  
17 David, “Fatal Choices: Israel’s Policy of Targeted Killing,” Mideast Security and Policy Studies, 
51, (2002), 8. 
18 Ibid., 7. The number one negotiation demand of the Palestinian Authority is the cessation of 
leadership targeting practices by Israel. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Kathryn Gregory, “Shining Path, Tupac Amaru (Peru, Leftists)” Council on Foreign Relations, 
August 27, 2009, http://www.cfr.org/peru/shining-path-tupac-amaru-peru-leftists/p9276#p5.  
21 Matt Frankel, “The ABCs of HVT: Key Lessons from High Value Targeting Campaigns Against 
Insurgents and Terrorists,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 34, no. 1 (January 2011), 17. Frankel posits a 
tenet of HVT is capture over kill, citing examples like the Japanese terror group Aum Shinrikyo, The 
Shining Path’s Abimael Guzman and Abdullah Ocalan from the Kurdistan People’s Party. The raids against 
bin Laden and Al-Shabaab’s Saleh Nabhan are examples where capture was conceivably possible, but 
ended in killing both. 
7 
arresting a terrorist leader is more effective than killing in order to prevent retaliation.22 It 
is important to note that the killing of Osama bin Laden, which was predicted to result in 
a massive wave of retaliatory attacks, has never materialized.23 Staeheli compared the 
effects between capturing and killing terrorist leaders and found little difference between 
the two. Instead, “insurgent organizations are most likely to collapse when they fail to 
name a successor regardless of whether the leader is killed or captured.”24  
2. The View That Leadership Decapitation Is Ineffective
Critics have claimed that leadership decapitation strategies are not only 
ineffective, but also counterproductive.25 Eliminating leadership can lead to an increase 
in retaliatory attacks, radicalization, and recruiting.26 Killing an influential or charismatic 
terrorist leader may increase popular support for the cause and create a martyrdom effect, 
which can increase a movement’s legitimacy.27 Byman’s research on Israel’s targeted 
killing policy found that while targeted killings reduce the lethality of attacks, the 
practice spurred retaliatory attacks and led to an increase in frequency of attacks.28 
Hosmer’s research finds that although leadership targeting operations have impeded or 
prevented terrorist strikes in some cases, those aimed at individual leaders have had 
marginal deterrent value. Assassinated leaders were quickly replaced and terrorism 
resumed, sometimes more ferociously than before.29  
22 Audrey Kurth Cronin, “How Al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups,” 
International Security 31, no. 1 (2006), 22. 
23 Bradley Jay Strawser, Killing bin Laden, A Moral Analysis, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, 
30. 
24 Paul Staeheli, “Collapsing Insurgent Organizations through Leadership Decapitation a Comparison 
of Targeted Killing and Targeted Incarceration in Insurgent Organizations,” (Master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2014): 20.  
25 Jordan, “When Heads Roll,” 723. Jordan also finds that targeting leaders of older, larger, and 
religious groups is not only ineffective, but counterproductive as well.  
26 Jenna Jordan, “Leadership Targeting of Terrorist Organizations,” Presentation at the Strategic 
Multi-Layer Assessment Support to SOCCENT Speaker Series, Tampa, FL, June 5, 2015. 
27 Daniel Byman, “Do Targeted Killings Work,” Foreign Affairs, 89 no. 2 (March-April 2006), 100. 
28 Byman, “Do Targeted Killings Work,” 99. For example, following leadership strikes against 
Hezbollah during the 1980s, the group quickly replaced its leaders and stepped up its suicide attacks on 
Israel 
29 Hosmer, “Operations against Enemy Leaders,” 25. 
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Capturing a leader can have negative consequences as well. The FLN leader 
Ahmed Ben Bella was captured after multiple abortive attempts to assassinate him. His 
capture increased the militancy of the FLN, resulted in a more unified organization, and 
effectively killed the chances of a negotiated settlement.30 Aaron Mannes highlights other 
negative consequences, including “greater radicalization of the targeted terrorist group, 
elimination of possible negotiating partners, and the triggering of retaliatory attacks.”31 
An additional unintended effect is the notion of raising the profile and relevance of 
terrorist organizations. Leaders from both Al-Qaeda and its affiliates have claimed that 
being killed by or escaping a drone strike is considered a badge of honor.32  
3. Improving Leadership Decapitation 
While there is consensus that leadership decapitation is not a silver bullet tactic 
that leads to the demise of organizations, there are conditions that favor its use.33 There is 
general agreement that leadership targeting is most effective when integrated with a 
broader counterterrorism strategy. For example, Israel’s targeted killing campaigns are 
most effective when executed in conjunction with other military operations, defensive 
measures and real-time intelligence.34 Frankel identified best practices that may improve 
the effectiveness of leadership decapitation. These include using host nation forces, 
capturing over killing, and understanding enemy organizational dynamics. Increasing the 
effectiveness of leadership targeting should include a deliberate calculation of benefits 
weighed against potential risks. Hosmer reasserts that any action taken must take into 
account the likely reactions, its effects of power relationships, and likeliness of enemy 
                                                 
30 Hosmer, “Operations against Enemy Leaders,” 35. 
31 Both Mannes and Jordan find that leadership decapitation against religious groups may even be 
counter-productive, increasing the frequency, lethality and number of overall attacks. 
32 Jack Serle, “U.S. Drone Strikes in Somalia Considered a Badge of Honour by Al Shabaab, Says 
BBC Africa Boss.” Bureau of Investigative Journalism, February 6, 
2015, http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2015/02/06/us-drone-strikes-in-somalia-considered-a-badge-
of-honour-by-al-shabaab-says-bbc-africa-boss/; Abdirahman Ali, Anatomy of Al-Shabaab: Terrorism 
Research & Analysis Consortium, 2010. 
33 Frankel, “The ABCs of HVT,” 28. 
34 Byman, “Do Targeted Killings Work?” 108. 
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behavior after the attack.35 Additionally, to develop an effective strategy against terrorist 
leadership, “one needs to understand their organizational culture, psychology and 
behavior.”36   
Weighing the benefits and costs of leadership decapitation is often difficult. As I 
alluded to earlier, leadership decapitation can be a paradoxical response to terrorism. This 
review suggests that the question of efficacy of leadership targeting is far from being 
satisfactorily settled. The United States’ inability to “degrade and destroy” terrorist or 
insurgent groups, despite eliminating numerous top tier leaders from terrorist 
organizations, underscores the need for a deeper understanding of the dynamics of 
terrorist leaders and their organizations. Likewise, identifying the conditions in which 
leadership decapitation is effective at destroying terrorist groups is critical. Although the 
use of leadership decapitation has amplified the efficacy debate, legal and moral 
considerations will continue to constrain its use against certain terrorist groups.37  
Furthermore, despite a lack of strategic successes, it is likely that leadership targeting 
operations will remain a counterterror tactic due to its immediate, measurable impact.  
                                                 
35 Hosmer, Operations against Enemy Leaders, 2.  
36 Gal Luft, “The Logic of Israel’s Targeted Killing,” Middle East Quarterly (Winter 2003): 8. 
37 John Odle, “Targeted Killings in Yemen and Somalia: Can the United States Target Low-Level 
Terrorists?” Emory International Law Review 27, no. 1 (2013): 605–660; Bradley Jay Strawser, Opposing 
Perspectives on the Drone Debate, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. 
10 
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II. ANATOMY OF U.S. LEADERSHIP DECAPITATION POLICY 
In a recent speech outlining his latest counterterrorism strategy, President Barack 
Obama vowed to degrade and defeat extremists groups and promised, “to use force 
against anyone who threatens America’s core interests.”38 The president highlighted his 
record of killing Osama bin Laden and much of Al-Qaeda’s leadership, as well as the 
recent elimination of Al-Shabaab’s Emir, using a mixture of drone strikes and special 
operations raids. Although targeted killings have been practiced for centuries, the 
United States has revolutionized its use in counterterrorism operations. The United 
States has adroitly evolved the practice since the ban on assassination through 
Executive Order 12333.39 Targeted killing has been redefined since the ban to reflect 
the current the realities of today’s conflicts.40 Furthermore, the administration defends 
targeted killing as legal, essential to keep Americans safe, and effective in combating 
terrorism.41  
In this chapter, I describe the contributing factors that led to the evolution of 
leadership targeting strategy currently used by the United States. I trace the origins of 
U.S. leadership decapitation and the conditions that contributed to the use of leadership 
targeting in the face of international terrorism incidents. I also identify factors that shaped 
the formulation of the policy, including the controversial detention program, the 
proliferation of armed drones, the dispersion and the spread of Al-Qaeda affiliates, and a 
reluctance to commit American troops into low-intensity conflicts. In turn, these factors 
constraint the approach to leadership targeting in ways that prevent the United States 
from having a clear and coherent counterterrorism strategy.  
                                                 
38 Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by the President on ISIL,” 
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 THE EVOLUTION OF LEADERSHIP TARGETING 
The United States’ policy of targeted killings and leadership decapitation was 
first used in 1986 against Libyan Dictator Muammar Qaddafi, who employed terrorism 
as an element of his foreign policy. Policymakers cited the United States’ inherent right 
of self-defense against nations that are culpable in aiding and abetting international 
terrorism to justify the attack.42 Later, several incidents of terrorist attacks against U.S. 
targets (Khobar Towers, the USS Cole, and American Embassies) spurred the Clinton 
administration to re-examine preemptive military options. The rhetoric was intensified by 
President Clinton, who issued findings that “foreign terrorists who pose a credible 
threat…will be subject to preemption and disruption abroad,” effectively overriding the 
assassination ban.43 New directives authorized counterterrorism units to lethally target 
Osama bin Laden, his lieutenants, and Al-Qaeda’s infrastructure. While the 
administration adopted an increasingly aggressive and lethal counterterrorism policy, 
self-imposed restraints kept special operations forces (SOF) from being employed against 
terrorist leaders.44 First, terrorism was viewed as a criminal act, and thus, terrorists 
should be brought to justice using law enforcement. Since the policy was to treat 
terrorists as criminals and apply the rule of law, it effectively removed any authority for 
the Defense Department to take the lead against terrorism. Second, as a criminal justice 
issue, terrorism was not up to the “standard of war” and not worthy of the military’s 
attention. As a result, arresting and prosecuting terrorists where they trained or planned—
Afghanistan, Yemen and Somalia—remained off-limits. This policy severely limited U.S. 
counterterrorism options, despite the murder of American citizens and military personnel 
abroad.  
The 9/11 attacks brought a change of philosophy for fighting terrorism and the 
pendulum swung toward lethal actions. The Bush Administration put USSOCOM as the 
lead in the war on terror, ordering it to track down and destroy Al-Qaeda around the 
                                                 
42 Parks, “Memorandum of Law,” 7. 
43 Bill Clinton, “Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-62,” Washington, DC: The White House, May 
22, 1998, 4. 
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globe.45 Since then, leadership decapitation against terrorist groups has expanded and 
escalated in Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, and Pakistan. Leadership decapitation 
strategies have inevitably expanded the role of the military’s elite counterterrorism units 
and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Consequently, both organizations execute 
leadership targeting using separate authorities and develop their own list of targets.46 
Technological breakthroughs in surveillance, intelligence, and armed drones have further 
extended America’s reach into previously denied areas.  
The Obama administration has taken several steps to justify the practice of 
targeted killing for a sustained, limited war model. In order to justify leadership targeting 
outside declared conflict zones, the Department of Justice (DOJ) produced a finding that 
relaxed the definition of imminence required to act in self-defense. The DOJ White Paper 
explicates that, “in a non-international armed conflict context, the fundamental law of 
war principles—necessity, distinction, proportionality and humanity—must be adhered to 
in targeted killing.”47 John Brennan, President Obama’s former counterterrorism advisor, 
further formalized the process for targeted killing, referred to as the counterterrorism 
playbook.48 Presented as an unclassified “Fact Sheet,” the United States established 
criteria for the use of lethal action. The policy extends leadership targeting to threats 
posed by Al-Qaeda and its “associated forces” and the employment of lethal force 
“outside areas of active hostilities.”49 The United States invokes a vigorous right to self-
defense. The policy states that lethal force can be used outside areas of active conflict 
when a senior leader poses an imminent threat to U.S. persons and when capture is not 
feasible. The determination of imminence gets more attention in the DOJ White Paper on 
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targeted killing, but it is relaxed to give the United States the ability to pre-empt or 
disrupt terrorist attacks in almost any stage of planning and execution.  
The unclassified Fact Sheet clearly expresses the preference of capturing leaders 
over killing; but in practice, lethal force is nearly always used. Two examples of high-
profile leaders whose capture was conceivably possible were Osama bin Laden and Saleh 
Nabhan, killed in Pakistan and Somalia, respectively. Intelligence officials argue that the 
best way to gather intelligence, preempt, and disrupt future terror attacks is to capture 
terrorist leaders instead of killing them.50 In the face of mounting threats, the United 
States’ adherence to its policy and principles of leadership decapitation remains tenuous. 
The policy is further complicated by the administration’s lack of a clear detention policy 
and the questionable value of intelligence gained from capture.51 With pledges to close 
Guantánamo Bay and concern over releasing dangerous terrorist suspects, there is a 
strong incentive to kill terrorist leadership instead of attempting capture.52  
A second factor drives leadership targeting toward kill over capture. 
Administration officials and analysts claim drones have decimated Al-Qaeda leadership53 
and have done so at relatively little cost, at low risk to U.S. forces, with fewer civilian 
casualties, and few political consequences.54 During his first year as president, Obama 
approved more drone strikes than Bush did during his eight years in office, most of them 
in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Additionally, drone use for surveillance and attack was 
dramatically expanded in Yemen and Somalia, where weak central governments are 
unable to combat AQAP and Al-Shabaab. 
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The Obama Administration’s aim to end the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and to 
remove American troops from foreign soil has also shifted the counterterrorism strategy 
toward leadership decapitation. However, analysts, argue that the rapid troop drawdown 
at the end of the Iraq War contributed to the rise and spread of the Islamic State.55 With 
no significant contingent of troops on the ground to combat terrorist groups, the United 
States’ reliance on leadership strikes has enabled the expansion of franchised groups such 
as ISIS, AQAP, and Al-Shabaab. The United States has also been reluctant to commit its 
forces into Middle East and African conflicts, opting instead to train, equip, and advise 
proxy forces such as is the AMISOM and Yemeni tribal militias.56  
The spread of Al-Qaeda’s affiliates has significantly shaped the way leadership 
targeting is used to combat terrorist groups. This evolution is due in part to the changing 
nature of the threat. As core Al-Qaeda leadership was weakened by targeted strikes and 
dispersed, affiliated groups grew stronger in states like Yemen, Syria, and Somalia. The 
rapid spread and expanding influence of Al-Qaeda affiliates and ISIS have spread 
throughout the Middle East and Africa, challenging central governments and swallowing 
up large swaths of territory. While Al-Qaeda’s core leadership may be “operationally 
ineffective,”57 its influence and expansion into weak and failing states has never been 
greater. Military commanders, such as then-USSOCOM commander, Admiral Bill 
McRaven, described the threat as “metastasizing,” referring to the rise of Al-Qaeda 
affiliates.58 This has led to the preference for low-cost and low-risk lethal options that 
deal severe blows to terrorist organizations without committing large military 
contingents, and, but being able to “stay in the fight.” 
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In this section, I have examined the factors that shape leadership decapitation 
policy and how lethal strikes have become the weapon of choice in the war against 
terrorist groups. The evolution of this policy has allowed the United States to sustain 
leadership decapitation through a non-war legal justification, giving it broad 
authorization in terms of where and against whom it can target. Successful lethal strikes 
against senior terrorist leaders combined with limited options for detention and trial 
continues to drive the targeting process toward a lethal track. In addition, the reluctance 
to be drawn into evolving international conflicts and the risks associated with putting 
troops in combat zones continues to dictate lethal options. The tactical advantages of 
drones also compels the United States to focus its efforts on leadership decapitation to 
eliminate or destroy terrorist groups. Although these factors have served to justify the 
U.S. counterterrorism strategy, key components prevent policy and strategy coherence. 
First, by opting to kill rather than capture, the ability to gain valuable intelligence about 
the group, operations and members is lost. Second, the policy largely ignores the issue 
of detention and whether terrorist leaders should be treated as combatants or criminals. 
Since the closure of black detention sites, offshore interrogation, and the difficulty of 
prosecuting suspects, the policy has simply shifted to the simpler, lethal tactic. 
Therefore, focusing on leadership decapitation, encourages a myopic view of defeating 
terrorist groups, and promotes a tactic that drives the overall strategy. In the next 
section, I describe the dynamics that inform the strategy and policy used specifically 
toward the terrorist group Al-Shabaab. 
 LEADERSHIP TARGETING IN SOMALIA 
How has the evolution of targeting killing governed the use of leadership 
decapitation against Al-Shabaab? Richard Shultz dubbed conditions limiting the use of 
lethal force against terrorist groups like Al-Shabaab as the Somali Syndrome.59 In 1993, 
Clinton ordered a mission to capture or kill Somali Warlord Mohammed Aidid in order to 
stabilize the humanitarian mission in Somalia. The administration expected a quick, 
surgical decapitation. Instead, the operation culminated in the deaths of 18 special 
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operators and the televised viewing of a U.S. Soldier being dragged through Mogadishu’s 
streets.60 The failed operation led, in part, to the Unites States’ future reluctance to put 
boots on the ground in Somalia, a heightened wariness about manhunting operations, and 
an aversion to using SOF to counter terrorist threats.61 However, targeting priorities 
changed considerably when Al-Qaeda’s plans to reconstitute in safe havens like Somalia 
were discovered through the interrogation of captured terror suspects. Alarmed by the 
influx of foreign fighters and money into the region, President George W. Bush directed 
the CIA and the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) to carry out its leadership 
targeting program in the shadows.62 By January 2003, JSOC discretely established 
operating bases in the Horn of Africa to carry decapitation operations against AQEA.63 
Currently, the United States justifies leadership targeting inside Somalia because Al-
Shabaab is deemed a direct threat and fits the definition of Al-Qaeda’s “associated 
forces.”64 Furthermore, the United States claims it can conduct leadership targeting inside 
Somalia, given the Somali Federal Government of Somalia (SFG) has offered its consent 
and is unable to directly address the threat itself. 
Al-Qaeda’s long history in East Africa expanded the war on terror’s battlefields 
into Somalia. Al-Shabaab has had a significant Al-Qaeda presence in its operating core 
since its formation.65 Al-Shabaab gradually solidified its relationship with Al-Qaeda 
central over time, and recently reaffirmed its allegiance after a leadership strike.66 Since 
2007, Al-Shabaab’s leadership has been targeted with other AQEA leadership and 
suffered repeated losses to its Emirs other senior intelligence and operational chiefs. The 
United States has focused on senior leadership within Al-Shabaab and only targeting 
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those who are planning attacks against U.S. interests.67 Overall, the U.S. administration 
has approved a small number of signature strikes,68 out of concern that widening the 
conflict could turn Al-Shabaab from a “regional menace into an adversary determined to 
carry out attacks on U.S. soil.”69 
Imposing a restriction on signature strikes in Somalia stands in stark contrast to 
the strategy in Yemen and Pakistan where both senior AQAP leaders and low-level 
fighters are subject to targeting.70 The United States has carried out an estimated 15–20 
strike in Somalia using drones, AC-130 gunships and special operations forces raids to 
kill Al-Shabaab’s leadership, primarily those with direct links to Al-Qaeda.71 Leadership 
targeting in Somalia undoubtedly increased once the group adopted Al-Qaeda’s global 
jihadist ideology, but the limited number of strikes against senior leaders in the group has 
not significantly degraded the group.72 While Al-Shabaab is no longer able to control 
large areas of territory, it has transformed into a dispersed asymmetric threat, capable of 
carrying out high-profile attacks across Somalia and East Africa. Security analysts 
suggest that the decapitation strategy is far below the level required to destroy the 
leadership network.73 The United States supports it leadership targeting operations with a 
small military footprint, which provide advice, training, and coordinate intelligence 
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efforts.74 A modest African proxy force numbering 22,000, with United States and 
United Nations support, also bolsters the effort. The Obama administration counts 
Somalia as a successful counterterrorism model, but Al-Shabaab has demonstrated 
resiliency against leadership targeting, and the regional threat from Al-Shabaab has 
intensified.  
 THE TERRORIST THREAT FROM AL-SHABAAB  
1. Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda 
Al-Shabaab’s strong connections with Al-Qaeda leadership were strong from the 
start of the organization, leading to their designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization 
(FTO) in 2008.75 Several of Al-Shabaab’s founding members traveled to Afghanistan 
during the Soviet intervention, and were highly important for the future Al-Shabaab. 
These early leaders were commonly referred to as the “Afghanistan veterans.” Al-
Shabaab’s first Emir, Aden Ayro visited Afghanistan in 1998 and met with Osama Bin 
Laden, and became highly admired amongst older Somali Afghan veterans.76 A second 
generation of Shabaab’s founders returned after 9/11, drawn by a duty to defensive 
jihad.77 Several members trained and fought alongside Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan before 
returning to Somalia. Al-Shabaab’s Afghan veterans promoted a more violent jihad and 
were important in the formation of the group’s jihadist ideology, including the goal of 
establishing an Islamic Caliphate in Somalia. Since then, Al-Shabaab has hosted and 
recruited foreign fighters. By doing so, they benefitted from technical assistance, training, 
and cooperation with affiliates, while strengthening its ties to Al-Qaeda.  
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Al-Qaeda East Africa played an important role in the ascendance of Al-Shabaab. 
Al-Shabaab’s protection of the AQEA leaders,78 who participated in the 1998 Embassy 
bombings, were essential for Shabaab’s early formation as a new jihadist network.79 Al-
Shabaab gained numerous benefits from sheltering AQEA leaders. While Al-Qaeda 
central institutionalized Al-Shabaab’s ideology, AQEA played an important operational 
role, commanding sizeable militia contingents and rising to senior positions within the 
group. Hansen argues that AQEA were highly respected by Al-Shabaab and functioned 
as informal leaders.80 Al-Qaeda East Africa leaders held high-ranking positions in Al-
Shabaab after establishing a considerable fighting reputation, and were given large 
militias to command.81 Al-Qaeda took the lead in training Al-Shabaab fighters, and 
individuals like AQEA leader Saleh Nabhan drove the development of tactics.82 The 
group received technical training in bomb making, establishing training camps and 
boosting international recruiting, especially online.83 Finally, the experience diffused to 
Al-Shabaab’s leaders in conducting high-profile, complex attacks, clandestine operations, 
and evading security forces for long periods cannot be understated. However, AQEA 
leadership faced numerous difficulties in Somalia: constant man hunting by both internal 
and external security forces, the hostility toward foreigners and a xenophobic society 
speaks to how well Al-Shabaab valued Al-Qaeda’s assistance, especially early in its 
formation. Al-Shabaab’s formal merger with Al-Qaeda in 2012 all but guaranteed the 
United States would continue to target Al-Shabaab in Somalia.84 
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2. The Terror Threat from Al-Shabaab 
What is the threat to the United States from Al-Shabaab? Given Al-Shabaab’s 
public statements and the ability to act upon threats within the region, Shabaab represents 
a significant terrorist threat U.S. interests in East Africa. Al-Shabaab also possesses a 
legitimate capability and willingness to conduct lethal operations outside of Somalia.85 
The Director of National Intelligence assessed that as Al-Qaeda’s core leadership loses 
influence, regional affiliates like Al-Shabaab will drive the global agenda.86 Due to 
continued military pressure leadership targeting and AMISOM offensives, Al-Shabaab 
was forced to change its strategy. After the failed offensive in late 2010, Al-Shabaab was 
no longer able to challenge government forces through conventional warfare. As a result, 
Al-Shabaab has shifted its internal focus to destabilizing the central government and 
AMISOM through guerrilla tactics such as: assassinations, ambushes and roadside 
bombs. Additionally, since its formal merger with Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab has focused on 
pursuing its global jihadist agenda and has shifted its attacks to focus on “soft” targets 
outside of Somalia. High-profile attacks in Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti further 
demonstrate its ability to plan, organize, and export terrorism, a tribute to its resiliency 
against leadership targeting.  
Al-Shabaab’s leadership has also warned of terrorist attacks on foreign targets, 
including American Embassies and symbolic targets in the United States. Al-Shabaab’s 
propaganda arm, Al-Kataib, influences Western jihadists sympathetic to its cause and 
skillfully controls the reporting of group’s actions to the Western world.87 Al-Shabaab 
has also capitalized on Anwar al-Awlaqi’s influential sermons aimed at Western 
audiences and Americans like Omar Hammami, who became an important military 
commander in Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab draws recruits from American cities and since 
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2007, at least 40 Somali Americans have fought in Somalia in support of Al-Shabaab, 
leading other foreign fighters and committing suicide attacks.88  
As Al-Qaeda’s influence has diminished across the Middle East, ISIS has made 
overtures to Al-Shabaab to join its ranks. Thus, far, Shabaab’s leadership is divided on 
whether to maintain its long-standing ties with Al-Qaeda or to follow Boko Haram as 
ISIS’ latest affiliate.89 An alliance with ISIS could further raise the profile of the group 
and provided sorely needed financial support to Al-Shabaab. A merger would also 
expand the reach and influence of ISIS and may provide a conduit for an influx of foreign 
fighters into Africa. While Al-Shabaab has yet to execute attacks in the United States, the 
group has demonstrated its ability to follow through with its threats to attack its enemies. 
Declaring its or loyalty with ISIS may give them a greater opportunity to do so. 
 DEGRADE BUT NOT DESTROY 
In this chapter, I traced the evolution of lethal targeting policy and strategies the 
United States has implemented to counter violent terrorist groups. Although once an ad 
hoc process, it has been codified to sustain leadership targeting campaigns in combat 
zones, and areas outside of declared conflict like Somalia and Yemen. I have highlighted 
the trends of leadership targeting: the expansion of Al-Qaeda affiliates and its offshoots, 
the proliferation of drone use against terrorist leadership, and the reluctance to commit 
ground troops to counter the threat. The United States’ decision limit its military footprint 
undoubtedly affects the overall strategy. Additionally, I have described the limitations the 
United States has faced as it has attempted to conduct leadership targeting operations 
against Al-Shabaab and how previous forays into Somalia have colored the approach. 
This strategy has significant impacts on the efficacy of the program overall in places like 
Somalia. Additionally, I have also outlined the terrorist threat from Al-Shabaab, its call 
for attacks in America, and its sophisticated propaganda arm that routinely recruits ethnic 
Somalis and Muslims from the United States. Last, the impact of a formal merger with 
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Al-Qaeda continues to galvanize Al-Shabaab’s global agenda, expanding its regional 
focus, and its ability to execute high-profile attacks in East Africa. As the next chapter 
will illustrate, the United States’ targeting methods have significantly impacted the 
conditions within Somalia that have allowed Al-Shabaab to survive.  
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III. TARGETING AL-SHABAAB LEADERSHIP 
  HISTORY OF U.S. LEADERSHIP TARGETING AGAINST AL-
SHABAAB 
The history of U.S. leadership targeting of Al-Shabaab in Somalia has been 
characterized by ad hoc measures and missed opportunities. In addition, the utility of the 
U.S. conflict model, consisting of airstrikes and proxy forces, has been questioned by its 
lack of progress in other conflict zones.90 That being said, the United States has affected 
both the capability and influence of Al-Shabaab in ways not completely understood or 
predicted. There is little doubt that charismatic leaders, as well as important operational 
chiefs, have been eliminated from the organization. However, Al-Shabaab has not been 
destroyed by leadership decapitation. The group has reinvented itself, reorganized, and 
survived as a guerrilla force with transnational aspirations.  
In this chapter, I identify three periods of Al-Shabaab’s history in which 
leadership targeting had an impact: First, shortly after 9/11, the United States fought a 
shadow war in Somalia to eliminate AQEA leadership through extraordinary rendition. 
Second, after the Ethiopian invasion in 2006, the United States collaborated with regional 
partners to target AQEA and Al-Shabaab leadership through airstrikes. Last, Al-
Shabaab’s merger with Al-Qaeda in 2012 and its adoption of a transnational jihadist 
agenda accelerated the leadership targeting campaign in Somalia. While Al-Shabaab’s 
ascendency through 2010 and its subsequent decline is predominantly due to local 
conflict conditions within Somalia, leadership targeting has had little impact on the 
group’s leadership hierarchy and its operational capability. I assess the overall 
effectiveness of the leadership targeting campaign from 2007–2015 by examining the 
changes or adaptions Al-Shabaab undertook in response to targeting. I close the chapter 
with a detailed examination of Al-Shabaab’s longest serving Emir, Ahmed Godane, who 
was killed in a U.S. drone strike in 2014. His case warrants further study because of the 
deep impact he had on the group. While Godane led Al-Shabaab from a loose network of 
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jihadists to the most powerful group in Southern Somalia at its peak, his consolidation of 
power and his leadership purge had far more of a negative impact than any leadership 
decapitation to date.  
 SHADOW WARS: 2002–2006  
Shortly after 9/11, the U.S. Joint Chiefs worked feverishly to gain legal authority 
to operate in Somalia, provide SOF authority and resources to target AQEA senior 
leadership, and create an intra-governmental system that facilitated time sensitive  
leadership targeting operations.91 This strategy of targeting senior leadership was 
described as “cutting off the head of the snake,” and was enticing to policymakers 
because it seemed to offer a “neat and relatively cheap solution to the intractable global 
problem of violent anti-Western Islamism.”92 Beginning in 2002, the U.S. administration 
opted to wage its campaign against AQEA largely in the shadows, primarily because of 
its involvement in Afghanistan and planning for an invasion of Iraq. This decision had 
significant impact on the growth of jihadist groups like Al-Shabaab. As described in a 
previous chapter, Al-Shabaab’s founders were believed responsible for providing safe 
haven to Al-Qaeda East Africa leadership responsible for the 1998 Embassy attacks and 
for planning future terrorist attacks in East Africa.93  
One of the major problems that beset U.S. operations against Al-Qaeda after 9/11 
was the lack of understanding among personnel charged with operating in East Africa.94 
The lack of intelligence assets further hindered the hunt for Al-Qaeda leaders seeking 
refuge in Somalia. Over the next year, the United States slowly built up resources and 
personnel in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti. The United States focused on intelligence 
collection and target development of Al-Qaeda and its associates in the Islamic Courts 
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Union, from which the group Al-Shabaab was empowered. Operations initially focused 
on building human and technical networks, but soon expanded to collaborating with 
warlords to hunt Al-Qaeda leadership.95 Operation BLACKHAWK was a CIA-led 
decapitation campaign against senior leaders of AQEA, which relied on the delicate 
loyalties of Somali warlords to capture a target and hand them over to the United States 
for interrogation. The rendition campaigns were an opportunistic partnership with the 
warlords who were anxious to convince Americans to support them financially and who 
portrayed themselves as partners in the War on Terror.96 In turn, the warlords labeled 
their rivals and critics as extremists and spawned a small industry in abductions, with 
hopes that those captured might be on the U.S. wanted list.97 Working with Somali 
warlords was risky: “You could never actually trust the warlords-they’re subject to the 
highest bidder.”98 The warlord’s willingness to capture and sell Al-Qaeda senior 
members included targeting Al-Shabaab’s early leaders, Afghan veterans, Aden Ayro and 
Mukhtar Robow.  
The most significant outcome of U.S. targeting strategy in Somalia was the ill-
fated decision to support the warlords. Matt Bryden, coordinator for the UN Monitoring 
Group on Somalia and Eritrea, criticized the CIA’s cooperation with Somali warlords, 
claiming the arrangement “actually strengthened the hand of the Islamists and helped 
trigger the crisis we’re in today.”99 The rendition program created resentment, public 
unrest and unified the ICU, who were themselves rendition targets. Supporting the 
unpopular warlords ended up expanding the ranks of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), 
from which Al-Shabaab had risen. By June 2006 the ICU, strengthened by Al-Shabaab, 
ran the warlords’ militias out of Mogadishu, effectively ending the United States covert 
rendition program, and its ability directly affect the capture of Al-Shabaab or Al-Qaeda 
leaders. The jihadists responded in kind with a campaign of intimidation and 
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assassinations, targeting Somalis working for Western intelligence agencies.100 
According to Al-Shabaab itself, rendition campaigns were also one of the reasons the 
group came into being.101 Nevertheless, by ignoring the unpopularity of the warlords, the 
United States actually strengthened the hand of the jihadists. 
Was the rendition program effective in eliminating Al-Qaeda leaders inside 
Somalia?  From 2002–2006, the warlords helped render seven or eight Al-Qaeda figures 
out of Somalia and transferred them to interrogation sites in Afghanistan.102 From a 
counterterrorism standpoint, the gains in human and technical intelligence provided 
plenty of targeting opportunities. However, capturing AQEA’s senior leaders proved 
difficult because of the untrustworthy alliances with warlords and protection provided by 
jihadist groups.103 Furthermore, despite improved intelligence capabilities within 
Somalia, the United States was unable to conduct any successful airstrikes or raids during 
the first half of the decade.104 Al-Qaeda was unable to organize and fully realize its 
mission in Africa,105 but jihadists matched the chaos created by rendition operations, 
assassinating the warlords tit-for-tat.106 While the rendition program may have been a 
success in terms of capturing Al-Qaeda operatives, its core leadership remained at 
large.107 The United States’ manhunts did keep Al-Qaeda off balance and were able to 
disrupt several planned operations against U.S. targets.108 The warlords’ defeat was a 
disaster for strategy, operational ambitions, and intelligence programs.109 What plagued 
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the campaigns against terrorist leadership in 2002 still hampers U.S. counterterrorism 
strategies today: the lack of cultural intelligence to understand group dynamics and the 
collaboration with unreliable partners. Consequently, the shadow wars between the 
United States and AQEA provided the setting in which Al-Shabaab emerged.  
 INSURGENCY: 2007–2010  
The United States’ support for foreign intervention significantly altered the 
conflict dynamics in Somalia. Al-Shabaab’s success at fighting the unpopular U.S. 
backed warlords, its radical ideology, and the ensuing invasion prompted Al-Shabaab to 
declare jihad against Ethiopia. Furthermore, Ethiopia’s invasion of Somali in late 2006 
accelerated conditions that Al-Shabaab easily exploited and the group seized the 
opportunity to portray itself as a defender of Somalis against foreign aggression.110  
How did the Ethiopian invasion affect the United States’ ability to target Al-
Shabaab? The Ethiopian invasion to oust the ICU provided the United States cover to 
assist the Ethiopians in targeting Al-Qaeda leadership and allowed further access into 
Somalia. During this time, the U.S. military’s missions in Somalia were taking on a lethal 
aspect, increasingly attempting to kill targets rather than capture them.111 U.S. aircraft 
was staged on Ethiopian airfields and small teams of advisors embedded with Ethiopian 
troops to coordinate airstrikes against Al-Shabaab and AQEA leadership.112 In early 
2007, the United States launched several airstrikes, pursuing Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda 
leaders, as they retreated toward the Kenya-Somali border.113 The United States struck a 
convoy of Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab leadership, marking its first combat operation inside 
Somalia since the September 2001 attacks.114 A third airstrike two days later targeted 
AQEA leadership near the Kenya border.115  
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The aggressive targeting was not without drawbacks. Foreign military 
intervention quickly propelled Al-Shabaab into leadership roles, giving it the cause and 
opportunity to instigate their vision of global jihad. Ethiopia recognized the hazards 
involved in military intervention in Somalia, worrying that any overt action would be 
portrayed as a crusade against Islam.116 The Ethiopians also objected to being cast as the 
United States’ proxy army. There were more repercussions from co-opting an aggressive 
targeting strategy vis-à-vis Ethiopia: African Union peacekeepers planned to replace 
Ethiopian troops, who were withdrawing, and a prophetic note of concern crept into 
exchanges between U.S. and Ethiopian officials. Ethiopians argued that U.S. military 
operations had little operational security and risked weakening international support for 
the newly established AMISOM peacekeeping force if United States’ actions were not 
kept at a low profile. The Ethiopians cited concerns that U.S. airstrikes created greater 
risk of terrorist attacks against African troop contributing countries (TCCs).117 Soon 
after, U.S. assets were forced to withdraw from Ethiopian soil, removing a critical 
capability used against Al-Shabaab leadership. This effectively, this ended the lethal 
targeting campaign that decimated Al-Shabaab in 2007.  
The results of U.S. lethal targeting practices were significant. As a result of 
aggressive targeting over the first half of 2007, Al-Shabaab was defeated in the field. The 
flurry of strikes killed or wounded several AQEA and Al-Shabaab leaders and effectively 
disrupted Al-Shabaab’s command and control. The increased paced of leadership 
targeting efforts scattered the group; some escaped into Kenya or went into hiding. 
Several of its most experienced leaders were killed or captured. Hundreds of fighters 
went home or were killed and morale suffered a heavy blow.118 Further, Al-Shabaab’s 
political Emir, Abdullahi Arale, was captured and transferred to Guantánamo Bay in June 
2007.119 This resulted in a group that was geographically fragmented between 
clandestine networks in Mogadishu and a small stronghold in Southern Somalia. 
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Despite these losses, without a permanent presence in Somalia, the ability to 
degrade Al-Shabaab leadership remained limited. Without a serious threat against its 
leadership, Al-Shabaab rebuilt its strength, stockpiled weapons, and redesigned its 
organization.120 It was during this time that Al-Shabaab’s second generation of foreign 
fighters poured into Somalia to wage jihad.121 Al-Shabaab also built support inside 
Somalia and within the wider Islamic world, particularly through its sophisticated 
Internet presence.122 Al-Shabaab was able to recover by raising funds, attracting recruits, 
and welcoming hundreds of foreign fighters into its ranks. Soon Al-Shabaab controlled 
more territory than any Al-Qaeda affiliate, ruling large parts of Southern Somalia.123  
The United States continued to prioritize efforts against Al-Qaeda legacy 
leadership and in May 2008, successfully decapitated Al-Shabaab’s first military Emir, 
Aden Ayro, and several senior operatives.124 Ayro was the group’s most notorious of Al-
Shabaab, leading Al-Shabaab’s military operations and advancement of the group’s 
radical ideology. The killing of Aden Ayro was hoped to exacerbate divisions within the 
nationalist and Islamist factions of Al-Shabaab. However, Al-Shabaab promised to 
avenge his death and announced that Ayro’s death would make no difference to its 
operations.125 Despite losing its military Emir and several lieutenants, Al-Shabaab was 
able to “recapture most of the territory of south-central Somalia as well as most of the 
capital Mogadishu, pinning Ethiopian forces, African Union peacekeepers, and the weak 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) down in a few districts of the city.”126 Hansen 
argues that while Aden Ayro was indeed an important figure in Al-Shabaab, by the time 
of his death he was easily replaceable.127 Ahmed Godane, one of Al-Shabaab’s co-
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founders, quickly succeeded Ayro. The emergence of Godane had a unifying effect on 
both its national and global jihadist factions. Godane’s freedom from clan loyalties in 
Southern Somalia placed him in an ideal position to unify Al-Shabaab’s factions under 
the banner of a radical Islamic ideology. Under Godane, Shabaab had a charismatic, 
visionary leader with broader ambitions for the group.128 In addition, his Islamic 
credentials and  military experience qualified him to lead Al-Shabaab from a dispersed, 
weakened organization into a unified and highly visible jihadist movement. As I describe 
later in this chapter, the leadership of Ahmed Godane presented a paradox for leadership 
targeting against Al-Shabaab.  
In 2009, the United States focused on intelligence and surveillance efforts toward 
remnants of AQEA. After years of intelligence work following Saleh Nabhan, the U.S. 
military successfully killed AQEA’s Emir. Years-long intelligence work enabled the 
United States to monitor his communications and to predict the precise time and location 
of the target. The United States developed several different plans to eliminate Nabhan, 
and a lethal option was chosen by the limited risk the United States was willing to take. 
Nabhan was a potential capture opportunity, arguably with an enormous potential for 
intelligence from interrogation. However, with both kill and capture options presented, 
the President opted for the “clean” option—killing Nabhan. This was chosen ostensibly 
because the United States had yet to establish a policy for terrorist detention outside of 
combat zones. The helicopter raid based from offshore carriers, resulted in the death of 
Nabhan and the capture of a “trove of valuable information.”129 The lethal targeting also 
demonstrated that the United States could conduct clandestine operations inside enemy 
territory with a small footprint, an option underutilized since the shadow wars of 2002. 
However, according to intelligence sources the decapitation had little long-term effect 
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against Al-Shabaab or Al-Qaeda operations.130 Despite the operations’ limited effects, 
only one of AQEA’s veterans, Fazul Mohamed, was known to be alive and free.131  
In July 2010, Al-Shabaab was able to execute its first successful terrorist attack 
beyond Somalia’s borders. Al-Shabaab acted on its multiple threats against Uganda and 
Burundi, which made up the bulk of AMISOM peacekeepers in Somalia. Aiming to drive 
Ugandan forces out of Somalia, suicide bombers killed 76 people watching a World Cup 
Soccer match in Kampala. Al-Shabaab took credit for the high-profile attack and warned 
of further attacks against foreign troops operating in Somalia.132 The attack was timed to 
gain maximum exposure for Al-Shabaab, and signaled that the group had the 
sophistication and expertise to carry out high-profile attacks outside Somalia. This attack 
also indicated Al-Shabaab’s willingness to expand its transnational operations, and 
offered a preview of Al-Shabaab’s future lethal terror attacks. International attacks have 
since provided the group greater notoriety and legitimized it as a contributor to the global 
jihad.133 
Al-Shabaab’s strength as an organization peaked in 2010. Convinced that 
government and AMISOM forces could be defeated in conventional battle, Al-Shabaab 
initiated a decisive battle in Mogadishu, known as the Ramadan offensive. Godane 
ordered the offensive despite objections by Al-Shabaab’s collective leadership, which 
opposed an all-out battle in favor of insurgency warfare. Al-Shabaab was unable to 
dislodge AMISOM forces from the capital, and the battle ended in humiliation for Al-
Shabaab, which lost up to 700 fighters and many top leaders. This alienated clans that 
suffered the most casualties and weakened Al-Shabaab significantly, especially Godane’s 
status as Emir. After the Ramadan offensive, Al-Shabaab was a changed organization. 
Internal divisions intensified, and predictions of fracturing were taken seriously in 
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Somalia.134 The group’s appetite for conventional warfare ended and it completely 
withdrew from Mogadishu by mid-2011. This weakened version of Al-Shabaab, which 
was now on the defensive, dictated a change in strategy. The United States responded by 
accelerating the pace of its leadership targeting operations. The next period of targeting 
from 2011–2015 came as a response to Al-Shabaab’s growing regional threat and its 
intention to attack foreign targets.  
Some analysts suggest that the aggressive counterterrorism policy and support of 
the Ethiopian invasion, provoked in part by Al-Shabaab, was a catalyst for the rise of 
radical jihadism in Somalia.135 While the United States’ designation of Al-Shabaab in 
February 2008 brought increased scrutiny on the group, overall efforts were restricted to 
legacy AQEA leadership targets. Meanwhile, the narrow focus on AQEA targets gave 
Al-Shabaab the time and space to reorganize, recruit, and entrench itself into Somali 
society.136 There is belief within the U.S. military that too much emphasis was placed on 
years hunting one or two AQEA leaders like Saleh Nabhan, supported by a belief that 
terrorist groups were centered on important leadership, and reinforced in other U.S. 
conflicts.137 
 GUERRILLA WARFARE: 2011–2015 
Al-Shabaab reached its weakest point politically and militarily when it announced 
its withdrawal from Mogadishu in August 2011. The group soon faced military 
offensives on three fronts in 2012, resulting in loss of territory at the hands of Ethiopia, 
Kenya, and AMISOM. Increased military pressure exacerbated divisions in the leadership 
network, leading to a period of vulnerability and infighting that would test the strength of 
its Emir.  
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Al-Shabaab’s fortunes slid quickly in 2011. Besides being humiliated in the ill-
fated Ramadan offensive, Fazul Mohamed, the last legacy member of AQEA leadership, 
was gunned down by government forces in June 2011. It is widely believed that Al-
Shabaab’s Emir, Ahmed Godane, set up Fazul as part of a power struggle between the 
group’s Somali and Al-Qaeda commanders.138 Al-Qaeda was dissatisfied with Godane’s 
leadership and planned to change Al-Shabaab’s Emir with someone with closer ties to 
Al-Qaeda.139 Fazul’s death, along with the death of British jihadist Bilal al-Berjawi, 
sparked a mass exodus of foreign fighters who believed that Godane was purging non-
Somalis from its ranks.140  
The United States scored multiple successes in targeting Al-Shabaab leadership in 
2011. However, the lack of viable detention policy continued to drive decisions on 
leadership targeting and have a greater impact both in and outside Somalia. The United 
States leadership targeting campaigns expanded, opening a cluster of drone bases in the 
Seychelles, Ethiopia, and Djibouti.141 In the meantime, the United States shifted focus 
toward Al-Shabaab’s cooperation with Al-Qaeda, killing a senior commander who 
planned the suicide attacks in Kampala, Uganda in July 2010.142 The United States 
conducted its first lethal drone strike in June 2011, killing foreign fighters with links to 
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and wounding Al-Shabaab’s Deputy Emir, 
Ibrahim al-Afghani.143 Al-Shabaab and AQAP would cooperate by reinforcing each other 
with fighters, while AQAP ideologues played a key role in Al-Shabaab’s indoctrination. 
AQAP has historically drawn reinforcements from Somalia with estimations of Somalis 
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being the largest foreign fighter group in the country.144 In turn, AQAP supplied Al-
Shabaab with weapons, training and financial support.  
Later, a senior commander who acted as a liaison between Al-Shabaab and 
AQAP, was captured at sea in the Gulf of Aden, exposing extensive operational ties 
between groups. Abdulkadir Warsame was seen as a potentially valuable source of 
information on both organizations, and a decision was made to capture him alive. 
According to author Daniel Klaidman, the U.S. military used local spies to penetrate 
Warsame’s network and arranged for Warsame to travel with no guards.145 With a 
moratorium on American troops on the ground by Yemeni President Saleh, and the 
aversion to risk in Somalia, the United States was able to penetrate Warsame’s network 
and manipulated the timing and logistics of his movements.146 This led to the surrender 
of Warsame “with minimal fuss.”147 
The pressured situation Al-Shabaab found itself in 2011 prompted significant 
changes to its organization. After being humiliated in the Ramadan offensive, Godane 
replaced two influential deputies with loyalists and suspended meetings of Shabaab’s 
decision-making council, the Shura.148 However, by slowly purging Shabaab’s 
leadership core of nationalists and political pragmatists, Godane narrowed the group’s 
broad appeal toward a strict global jihadist agenda and alienated many former 
sympathizers.149 As described later in this chapter, Al-Shabaab’s Emir, Ahmed Godane 
was responsible for the consolidation of power, disbanding leadership councils, and 
relying on an autocratic leadership style.150 Militarily, Al-Shabaab went back to its roots, 
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adopting a strategy that brought them success in 2007, conducting assassinations and 
suicide bombings to counter superior forces of AMISOM.151 Al-Shabaab’s merger with 
Al-Qaeda in February 2012 was met with resistance within both organizations, and 
exacerbated the divisions within Al-Shabaab.152 Operationally, the merger meant little, 
but it served to strengthen the global jihadist faction within Al-Shabaab and solidified 
important ideological ties.  
In June 2013, Godane responded to his critics by purging dissenting leaders 
within the group. First, Godane loyalists killed Ibrahim al-Afghani and Moalim Burhan in 
a shootout after the two resisted arrest. In September, Al-Shabaab assassins tracked down 
and killed Omar Hammami and a group of foreign fighters. Isolated Al-Shabaab leaders 
Mukhtar Robow and Hassan Aweys were also forced to flee to escape the purge. While 
Aweys surrendered to the central government, Robow established himself in his home 
region protected by his clan.153 As a result, Godane’s consolidation of power within Al-
Shabaab robbed it of experienced leaders and diminished the group’s influence within 
essential clan constituencies. Al-Shabaab’s leadership losses precipitated its high- profile, 
unconstrained acts of terrorism. 
Despite its weakened leadership core, Al-Shabaab continued to show its 
capability as a guerrilla force with high-profile attacks on the Somali Supreme Court and 
the United Nations compound in Mogadishu, producing high casualties and severely the 
central government. Al-Shabaab’s Amniyat, became central to its asymmetric strategy 
and produced some of Al-Shabaab’s most high-profile attacks. In September 2013, a 
small team of gunmen attacked a Western-own shopping center in Nairobi, killing 67 and 
wounding 200. As a result, the United States launched a raid to capture or kill the Al-
Shabaab senior leader responsible for planning the Westgate attack. The pre-dawn 
amphibious-based assault was beaten back after a heavy firefight.154 While the raid was 
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unsuccessful, the United States showed it had the capability and willingness to accept 
some measure of risk in order to detain a senior leader of Al-Shabaab, a tactic 
underemployed since the shadow wars. U.S. targeting lists soon expanded to include 
senior planners and operatives who were involved in planning external terrorist attacks 
and were aimed at disrupting Shabaab’s assassination campaigns. In 2014, U.S. targeting 
efforts reached its height, employing drone strikes against senior leaders from Al-
Shabaab’s Amniyat. The U.S. military’s successful campaign of drone strikes against Al-
Shabaab senior leadership were followed by press statements claiming that their deaths, 
“will significantly impact al-Shabaab’s ability to conduct attacks,” and “his death has 
dealt another significant blow to…al-Shabaab.”155 Over the next year, Al-Shabaab would 
lose multiple senior leaders of the Amniyat, yet Al-Shabaab remained capable of 
planning complex operations outside Somalia.156  
In September 2014, the United States successfully eliminated Al-Shabaab’s long 
standing Emir, Ahmed Godane. Godane’s death, lauded as another “significant blow” to 
Al-Shabaab, came at a vulnerable time for the group. Analysts were also quick to 
conclude that, “his death would result in an increasing number of defectors and bring the 
inevitable break-up of the group.”157 As described later in this chapter, Godane’s removal 
drove optimism that his demise would seal the decline of Al-Shabaab. Success in 
leadership targeting, however, was short-lived. In April 2015, Al-Shabaab gunmen 
stormed Garissa University in Kenya and killed 147 students, Al-Shabaab’s deadliest 
terrorist attack to date.158  
Al-Shabaab’s “reinvention” signaled it was no longer simply a Somali jihadist 
organization.159 As Al-Shabaab was forced from its traditional strongholds, it expanded 
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into Southern Somalia and in Kenya, where its key affiliate, al-Hijra is based.160 Al-
Shabaab has survived as a guerrilla group despite the successive removal or disruption of 
its core leadership. Al-Shabaab has shown its resiliency toward leadership disruption; the 
group suffered multiple successive losses to its Amniyat, its longest serving Emir, as well 
as disunity within the group’s nationalist and jihadist factions.161 Al-Shabaab remains a 
lethal guerrilla force. It has demonstrated through significant pressure on its leadership 
structure that it can weather the storm. The U.S. counterterrorism strategy in Somalia is 
often described as a successful model, one that could be duplicated in other troubled 
African countries. However, the recent surge in violence demonstrates that leadership 
targeting strategy may have reached its limits against a resilient enemy.162 
 LEADERSHIP DECAPITATION: THE CASE OF GODANE 
Godane’s removal is a paradox of leadership targeting. His removal warrants a 
dispassionate analysis as to whether his killing will have an impact on the group’s 
capability to conduct future terrorist attacks. Godane’s death has led to predictions of Al-
Shabaab fracturing into competing factions, but a year after his death, this has not 
become reality. In this section, I examine the positive and negative impacts Ahmed 
Godane had on Al-Shabaab during his tenure as Emir, and posit whether the purported 
benefits of eliminating Al-Shabaab’s top terrorist outweigh the harm he single-handedly 
inflicted on the group.  
1. Al-Shabaab’s Golden Age 
Godane’s rise to power was unparalleled in Somalia’s jihadist history.163 His 
origins outside clan conflict areas meant he was free of the rivalries that dominated 
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Southern Somalia. Godane’s Islamist credentials and military training made him an ideal 
candidate to lead Al-Shabaab after Aden Ayro’s death. Under Godane, Al-Shabaab’s 
leadership was drawn from a diverse array of clans, which facilitated decentralized 
control and built popular support. Godane promoted a more violent jihadist agenda after 
returning from fighting in Afghanistan and became the group’s chief ideologue. Godane 
was instrumental in reorganizing the Al-Shabaab into an insurgency force after being 
expelled from Mogadishu in 2006. During his tenure, Al-Shabaab reached the height of 
its power, overseeing the rapid expansion of Al-Shabaab’s territorial control.164 By 2010, 
the group controlled nearly all of Southern Somalia and most of the areas in the capital of 
Mogadishu. At Al-Shabaab’s high point, it controlled more territory than any other Al-
Qaeda affiliate, an example of Islamic governance lauded by prominent jihadist 
ideologues such as Anwar al-Awlaki.165 
Under Godane, Al-Shabaab adopted an increasingly global jihadist agenda despite 
the group’s historical Salifist-Irridentist ideology. Godane focused on hardline Islamic 
issues and had a strong relationship with Al-Qaeda leadership, which led him to petition 
Al-Qaeda to accept Al-Shabaab as an official affiliate. Godane oversaw the introduction 
of suicide tactics, foreign fighters, and declarations of allegiance toward Al-Qaeda.166 It 
was not until after bin Laden’s death however, that Al-Shabaab was accepted, 
announcing its formal merger in 2012. Godane’s global jihadist ideology sanctioned 
high-profile attacks against civilians, threatened to attack the west, which undoubtedly 
raised his priority for lethal targeting efforts. While this may have narrowed the group’s 
domestic appeal, it broadened Al-Shabaab as an Al-Qaeda brand. Godane oversaw the 
group’s martyrdom operations, which was an assassination campaign that represents a 
serious threat to the stability of the Somalia central government. Under Godane, Al-
Shabaab developed a sophisticated media network that connected the organization within 
the wider struggle for joining the global jihad, drawing foreign fighters and raising its 
international profile.   
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2. Discontent and Purge 
Godane’s desire for undisputed power and autocratic methods weakened Al-
Shabaab’s internal cohesion. While differences between Godane and its co-founders 
existed since at least 2008, they were initially settled collectively. This is primarily 
because the executive Shura still functioned to settle disputes through mediation. 
Godane’s divisiveness alienated its founding leaders from the group, and compelled 
prominent members to break ranks from Al-Shabaab. Godane also faced mounting 
criticism from other senior leaders in Al-Shabaab for his erred judgment in the Ramadan 
Offensive. Godane planned and ordered the August 2010 offensive. Subsequent failed 
offensives increased the dissention to the point where Godane eventually replaced his 
critics with loyalists. It was of great consequence, then, when Godane suspended 
meetings of the Shura shortly after multiple tactical errors. His suspension of the Shura 
undoubtedly exacerbated the divisions within the group. 
Godane’s unilateral decisions made outside the Shura were unpopular, especially 
his decision to formally align Al-Shabaab with Al-Qaeda in 2012. Ironically, Osama bin 
Laden advised the Emir to conceal Al-Shabaab’s ties to Al Qaeda in order to avoid 
unwanted attention from the West.167 In the months following the merger with Al-Qaeda, 
Godane’s opponents within Al-Shabaab accused him of excessive brutality and 
mistreatment of foreign leadership. In an open letter to Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-
Zawahiri, leadership decried Godane for acting like a dictator and his draconian 
implantation of Sharia law, unpopular in a Somali setting. Anticipating a leadership 
struggle, Godane abolished the Shura and delegated power into loyal regional governors 
and military commanders.  
Another source of disagreement among Al-Shabaab leadership concerned 
Godane’s use of the Amniyat, the group’s intelligence agency. Godane established the 
Amniyat to act as his person counter-intelligence arm, responsible for eliminating internal 
threats and enforcing loyalty.168 Godane strengthened the Amniyat and used it as a tool to 
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centralize power. The Amniyat by-passed the Shura, arresting or executing spies and 
imprisoning rivals in order to reduce divisions in the group. The Amniyat also jailed or 
killed defectors, inducing a fear in Al-Shabaab leaders who were contemplating leaving 
the group.169 While Godane’s purge brought Al-Shabaab under his control, it created 
many enemies within the ranks of Al-Shabaab. Discontent with Godane’s decisions 
brought longer-simmering differences between Al-Shabaab to a head, and Al-Shabaab 
leaders called for change of Emir.170 Anticipating a leadership struggle, Godane 
prohibited the formation of jihadist groups within Al-Shabaab controlled areas. The 
Amniyat moved against outspoken leadership, killing them when they refused to 
surrender. Other prominent members fled for their own safety. The irony of Godane’s 
removal of his rivals is that he eliminated his would-be successor, Al-Afghani, a one-time 
advisor and co-founder of Al-Shabaab. 
Godane’s purge depleted Al-Shabaab’s leadership of its most experienced and 
influential members. Al-Shabaab’s weakened condition was not unlike Al-Shabaab’s 
early leadership targeting troubles in 2007, and had similar results. Al-Shabaab was 
increasingly isolated among the Somali population.171 Al-Shabaab’s alignment with Al-
Qaeda’s extremist fringe further narrowed its appeal within the broader Somali clan 
community, from which it drew popular support.172 Godane’s mistreatment of foreigners 
resulted in a mass exodus from Somalia after the deaths of prominent foreigners, which 
many believe were orchestrated by Godane. Finally, Godane’s autocratic leadership 
methods severely degraded the strength and influence of Al-Shabaab, and would likely 
have continued to isolate the group from clan and popular support.173 
Days after Godane’s death, Al-Shabaab announced the successor as Abu Ubaidah, 
a relatively unknown Godane loyalist. Ubaidah reportedly played an instrumental role in 
the purge of 2013 and was an experienced operational chief in Al-Shabaab before acting 
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as Godane’s personal advisor. Ubaidah’s position as Godane’s closest advisor suggests 
that he shared Godane’s vision for Al-Shabaab, emphasizing a global jihadist ideology 
and rejecting Somali nationalist goals.174 Consequently, the unanticipated response from 
Al-Shabaab’s new Emir has been one of reconciliation and unification, reaching out to 
Shabaab’s isolated leaders. Policy makers hoped that Godane’s removal would weaken 
the group’s radical contingent and pave the way for defections and fractionalization. 
However, it appears Al-Shabaab survived another leadership decapitation. 
 NARROW FOCUS 
The United States has approached leadership targeting as an “Alexandrian 
solution.”175 The aggressive use of lethal attack against Al-Shabaab’s leadership has been 
able to affect both the capability and influence in ways not completely anticipated or 
predicted. The focus of leadership targeting against Al-Qaeda leaders early in Al-
Shabaab’s life cycle was an attempt to localize the group and avoid being drawn into 
another conflict. However, this decision allowed Al-Shabaab to grow unabated in 
strength and influence. The leadership targeting campaigns were then expanded in an 
attempt to combat the increasingly unconstrained threats and spread of terrorism 
throughout East Africa. Nonetheless, these efforts have not been able to disrupt Al-
Shabaab’s ability to execute complex terrorist attacks against the U.S. backed-Somali 
Federal Government (SFG) and against Somalia’s neighbors. The elimination of Godane 
was predicted to severely damage the group’s operational capability and further splinter 
the group along strengthened nationalist factions.176 In reality, the opposite has 
happened. Important leaders have not splintered and as previously stated, may have even 
been welcomed back into the collective fold.  
Pundits might ask whether the elimination of Al-Shabaab’s most divisive and 
unpopular leader was the appropriate tactic for precipitating the decline of Al-Shabaab as 
a terrorist group. Godane’s importance to Al-Shabaab was undeniable even after he 
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consolidated power and homogenized its radical ideological agenda. His status as a 
terrorist threat to United States’ interests and the overwhelming appeal to eliminate him 
likely guaranteed his eventual death through lethal targeting. Yet, one must question 
whether the United States was in a position to capitalize on the chaos and disunity created 
by Ahmed Godane, reminiscent of Al-Shabaab’s early troubles in 2007. Currently Al-
Shabaab still retains the capability to strike government and military targets at the time 
and place of their choosing,177 proving its resilience and effectiveness as a terrorist 
group. 
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IV. RESILIENCE TO LEADERSHIP DECAPITATION 
The killing of Ahmed Godane deprived Al-Shabaab of its longest ruling Emir and 
chief ideologue and strategist. Analysts viewed his death as a significant blow to an 
already divided organization, resulting in more predictions of Al-Shabaab’s collapse.178 
Moreover, the successive losses against Al-Shabaab’s most powerful entity, the Amniyat, 
were expected to reduce the threat of external attacks and assassinations of government 
officials.179 However, despite these instances of successful targeting, Al-Shabaab 
remains a potent threat to Somalia and its neighbors. In this chapter, I examine the 
elements within Al-Shabaab that are affected by leadership targeting, and the structural 
mechanisms that make Al-Shabaab resilient to this targeting. 
Analyzing the conditions under which Al-Shabaab is both vulnerable and 
susceptible to leadership attacks critical to developing a strategy for effective 
counterterrorism. In the first section, I analyze a theory of terrorist leadership as it applies 
to leadership targeting and posit why Al-Shabaab has been able to survive multiple 
strikes to its top-tier leaders. I argue that to begin with, while Al-Shabaab’s leaders 
initially fulfilled important inspirational and operational roles, but their influence 
diminished over time. As a result, Al-Shabaab was able to survive the decapitation of its 
Emir and continued to conduct complex terrorist operations. Next, I examine two 
important leadership mechanisms that further affected Al-Shabaab’s resiliency to 
leadership targeting: the Shura and the Amniyat. I argue that both units are just as 
important to the long-term survival of the organization as the Emir. Al-Shabaab’s 
retained its operational capability despite the loss of its top leader. 
In Section Two, I analyze Al-Shabaab’s organizational resilience in the face of 
leadership losses by examining the structural changes the group undertook to defend 
itself from collapse. Al-Shabaab’s resiliency can thus be attributed to tow adaptations: 
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decentralization transferred operational autonomy and authority to regional governors 
and field commanders, and bureaucratization, which dispersed functional responsibilities 
and routinized Al-Shabaab’s ideology. These changes reduced Al-Shabaab’s reliance on 
top leaders and made the organization resilient to leadership attacks. 
 IMPORTANCE OF LEADERSHIP IN AL-SHABAAB 
Al-Shabaab has survived multiple losses of its top leaders and has endured as a 
potent terrorist force. To explain why Al-Shabaab has thus far been resilient, an 
examination of how important Al-Shabaab leadership is to maintain organizational 
integrity is necessary. First, to make an obvious point, for leadership targeting to be an 
effective tactic, it must eliminate leaders providing either inspirational or operational 
benefit, or both.180 Important leaders generally fulfill one of two roles in terrorist 
organizations: inspirational or operational. Leadership plays an essential role in 
organizational integrity as well. Since integrity (and unity) is necessary to achieve 
organizational goals, failure to maintain unity leads to dissention in the organization and 
eventually leads to group decline.181 In addition, collective leadership bodies are an 
important unit in terrorist organizations. Collective leadership contributes to 
organizational integrity by dealing with formulation of strategy, distribution of resources 
and command responsibilities. Disagreements over power, strategy, and resources, which 
often are sources of conflict among leadership, are settled collectively. In terrorist groups, 
collective bodies plan and oversee all aspects of the organizations’ operations and consult 
the leader throughout the decision-making process.182  
1. Value of Inspirational Leadership 
At the outset, Al-Shabaab’s leaders were inspirationally important to the 
formation of the group. Al-Shabaab’s Emir provided inspirational leadership to its 
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members through the articulation of the group’s ideological vision. Al-Shabaab’s rhetoric 
echoed Al-Qaeda’s focus on defensive jihad, popular even with clan minded, nationalist 
leaders. The group’s early leaders radical ideology also depicted Islam as under attack 
and inspired young Somalis and foreign fighters to join Al-Shabaab. The elimination of a 
single Al-Shabaab leader then had little effect on the ideology of the group, which 
continued to be expressed by multiple influential leaders and disseminated through 
sophisticated media operations.183 Al-Shabaab’s early leaders experience in waging jihad 
in Afghanistan alongside Al-Qaeda was also important in attracting new members. Al-
Shabaab’s members point to its founding leaders’ charisma and stature as important for 
joining,184 and many analysts point to the charismatic traits of Al-Shabaab’s Emir, 
Ahmed Godane.185 Godane’s exceptional oratorical skills secured him considerable 
influence, and he became “the chief ideologue, custodian, and interpreter of Al-Shabaab’s 
doctrine.”186 He often cited the poetry of the “Mad Mullah,” an anti-colonial hero in 
Somalia, which he injected into his communiqués and propaganda.187  
Conversely, inspirational leadership can diminish over time, resulting in decreases 
in ideological influence, and the overall importance in the organization.188 The increased 
targeting pressure and military setbacks also limited Godane’s capacity to lead in the 
open.189 Godane rarely appeared in public, disseminating most of his missives through 
the Internet. He was reportedly wary of drone strikes, escaping on at least two 
occasions,190 and avoided talking on telephones.191 Godane also feared someone in his 
                                                 
183 Christopher Anzalone, “The Nairobi Attack and Al-Shabab’s Media Strategy,” CTC Sentinel 6, 
no. 10 (October 2013), 2. 
184 Hansen, Al-Shabaab in Somalia, 46. 
185 Anzalone, “The Life and Death,” 1. 
186 Chothia, “Ahmed Abdi Godane.” 
187 Abdirahman Ali, “Somalia: Al-Shabaab after Godane?” See also Randal Gray, “Bombing the 
‘Mad Mullah’—1920,” The RUSI Journal, 125, no. 4 (1980): 41–47. 
188 Freeman, “A Theory of Terrorist Leadership,” 669 
189 For security reasons Al-Shabaab’s leaders have a limited ability to participate in meetings, move 
freely and communicate by telephone and radio.  
190 Slater, Woods and Serle, “Somalia: Reported U.S. Covert Actions 2001–2015.” 
191 Maruf, “Sources on Final Days.” 
 48 
inner circle would betray him, after a $7 million reward was authorized by the United 
States.192 For these reasons, Godane’s importance as an inspirational leader was in 
decline. Godane’s decentralization of authority to regional commanders, who planned 
their own military operations and recruited forces locally, further contributed to his 
declining influence.193 Godane’s importance as an ideologue also diminished over time. 
His decision to merge with Al-Qaeda was an unpopular one, as his extreme interpretation 
of Islam, which spurred his critics to call for his removal.194 Opting for a violent method 
of conflict resolution further called into question his legitimacy as Emir. In the beginning, 
Al-Shabaab relied upon charismatic leadership to develop and advance the organization’s 
ideological objectives. However, as the organization grew, gained territory, and became 
entrenched in Somali society, the importance of inspirational leadership diminished over 
time.  
2. Value of Operational Leadership 
In addition to inspiring members, leaders also provide guidance on strategy, 
tactics, and day-to-day operations.195 While inspirational leaders identify the grand vision 
or ideology, operationally important leaders make decisions on the means to carry out 
their objectives. These objectives include making important decisions such as whether to 
engage in the political process, or if violence against civilians is permissible. Operational 
leaders also decide how the organization operates internally, such as recruitment, 
logistics, and training.196 Early on, leadership is able to exercise direct control over 
members. However, as the organization succeeds and grows, the size often exceeds the 
span of control. For this reason, operational decisions are often delegated to lower levels 
of command. As described later in this chapter, decentralization and bureaucratization are 
two mechanisms that Al-Shabaab use to overcome the increasingly complex command 
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and control requirements to remain successful. As a result, both mechanisms became 
increasingly important as the organization grew, and resulted in the delegation of 
authority and influence to operational leadership.  
Operational leadership was important in Al-Shabaab’s early history. After being 
expelled from central Somalia in 2007, the few surviving leaders were critical in 
organizing Al-Shabaab to fight an insurgency, and organized the group’s governing 
structures that enabled it to recruit, finance, and sustain its membership. However, one 
major event precipitated the Emir’s operational decline: Al-Shabaab’s ill-fated military 
offensives in Mogadishu. In this aspect, Godane was operationally important because he 
was able to exert his authority to plan and execute a major military operation, despite the 
opposition of Al-Shabaab’s decision-making council.197  
After Al-Shabaab’s defeat in Mogadishu, there was widespread discontent with 
Godane’s involvement in military operations, which damaged his status and led others to 
contest his leadership. Influential leaders called for his resignation and the disbandment 
of his operationally important intelligence arm.198 Afterwards, Al-Shabaab’s leadership 
council reasserted itself, and elected to change strategy, which grew as much from 
necessity as by choice. As Godane’s influence in military matters declined, autonomous 
decision-making in day-to-day military operations increased. In the process, Al-Shabaab 
matured as an organization and cultivated a new generation of jihadist leaders, steeped in 
Al-Shabaab’s ideological creed and military doctrine. Thus, Al-Shabaab was capable of 
replenishing the losses from the movement’s leadership.199 In fact, the ranks of unknown 
mid-level leaders were so numerous and ideologically committed, that Al-Shabaab was 
able to replace lost leaders with ease.200 As a result, Al-Shabaab relied on operational 
level leaders to execute its asymmetric strategy through guerrilla-style attacks against 
government forces.  
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3. Value of Collective Leadership 
Collective leadership is one mechanism that minimizes the impact of leadership 
decapitation. In terrorist groups, institutionalizing a collective leadership body can 
minimize the impact of a loss of an individual leader. When a leader is removed from the 
top of the organization, the collective body is able to maintain continuity and unity, since 
inspiration or operational guidance is dispensed through multiple important leaders. 
Although collective leadership enables terrorist groups to act cohesively and settle 
differences for the benefit of the group, they often do not share the same motivations and 
ideology of the whole. Yet, Al-Shabaab’s diverse, but unified collective leadership 
structure, has enabled the group to overcome disagreements or disruptions like leadership  
decapitation. 
Al-Shabaab is ruled by collective leadership, with decision-making undertaken by 
a by a council of senior leadership. The executive Shura is the highest decision-making 
body of Al-Shabaab, and is dominated by eight to ten members, representing multiple 
clans and factions of the group.201 The executive Shura also functions as a mechanism for 
holding individual members accountable for their actions, including the Emir.202 The 
Shura fills important roles within Al-Shabaab, deciding on strategy, ideology, nomination 
of leadership, and means to reach objectives. The Shura also fulfills the requirement for 
deciding practical matters, such as negotiating with other actors for financial support, 
recruiting, or resources.203 Additionally, the military leadership of Al-Shabaab is under 
the strong influence of the Shura, and is involved in target selection, incorporation of 
foreign fighters and providing guidance for military operations.204 The most significant 
function Al-Shabaab’s collective leadership is maintaining unity of the group under 
conditions of hardship or internal disagreements. The Shura is critical in settling 
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disagreements and disputes within the organization, such as power sharing and 
strategy.205  
Al-Shabaab has a tradition of problem solving amongst its leadership, allowing it 
to maintain relative unity. Hansen attributes this unity, as one of the reasons for its ability 
to withstand divisions and leadership deficits.206 We can further attribute Al-Shabaab’s 
capacity to withstand leadership attacks in part to this unique ability to unify its diverse 
subgroups and the continuity through provides in operational and ideological guidance. 
Demonstrating its capacity to carry on in the face of leadership decapitation, Al-Shabaab 
announced the appointment of a successor within a week of the airstrike that killed its 
Emir. Al-Shabaab also proclaimed that the Emir’s death would have no effect on the 
group.207 The succession of Al-Shabaab’s next Emir was introduced without major 
interruption in part because the group’s governing council was able to overcome the 
disruption.208 Consequently, Al-Shabaab was most vulnerable to leadership targeting 
under the conditions it faced during the suspension of the Shura, whereby the leadership 
was unable to meet to disseminate guidance and settle serious differences in the 
organization.  
4. The Amniyat and Its Role in Organizational Resilience 
In addition to ways the collective leadership of the Shura bolstered Al-Shabaab’s 
resilience to leadership targeting, Al-Shabaab further established additional 
organizational mechanisms that would safeguard its survival in the face of such tactics. 
Similar to the Shura, the Amniyat was first established to enforce unity within the 
organization, and defend itself from leadership disruption. However, the unit serves the 
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dual purpose of a clandestine assassination force, carrying out complex terror attacks 
against the SFG.209 
The Amniyat serves important roles that indirectly allow the group to maintain its 
operational capability even as the leadership cadre is eroded by airstrikes. The Amniyat is 
responsible for detecting internal threats and enforcing loyalty to the Emir by integrating 
functions of a secret police.210 As previously described, Ahmed Godane strengthened the 
role and resources of Amniyat as a tool to identify internal threats and consolidate power. 
The group also protects the senior leadership from fracturing and exhibits a peculiar 
unifying effect by discouraging dissent, through executions and imprisonment. Next, Al-
Shabaab has adapted its military strategy to the demands of asymmetrical warfare on the 
ground in Somalia. The Amniyat’s assassination operations have become increasingly 
central to its terrorism efforts, especially in Mogadishu, where it targets government 
officials in order to destabilize the central government and prevent political progress.211 
Even as Al-Shabaab lost territory, the Amniyat maintained a significant operational 
presence in major urban areas, demonstrating the organization’s clandestine capability.212 
The Amniyat’s ability to operate effectively in areas under AMISOM or government 
control severely undermines the stability and political authority in Somalia.213 
Thus, we see that Al-Shabaab’s intelligence wing shields the group from 
leadership disruption in two distinct ways: First, through its counter-intelligence 
activities, it suppresses dissenting views and enforces loyalty within the overall 
leadership core. Second, it operates outside the typical command structure and its 
clandestine operations avoid the exposure from counterterrorism efforts. The Amniyat’s 
independent operations help explain the lethal capability the group maintains, in spite of 
the attrition of Al-Shabaab’s senior leadership by U.S. targeting. The Amniyat has 
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effectively developed the capabilities necessary to carry out a protracted campaign of 
assassinations, suicide bombings, and terrorist attacks behind enemy lines.214 Operating 
outside the normal command structure prolongs the life of Al-Shabaab, since its 
operations do not attract the same scrutiny as its leadership.215 It is likely the current 
Emir will continue to rely on the Amniyat to maintain loyalty in the face of defections, 
splitting into competing factions, and overtures by rival jihadist groups.216 Thus, Al-
Shabaab’s “secret service,” is structured to survive the dissolution of Al-Shabaab in the 
face of leadership targeting.217 
 AL-SHABAAB’S ORGANIZATIONAL RESILIENCE 
As terrorist groups grow and mature, they undergo changes in which leaders are 
increasingly less important to the organization. After Al-Shabaab’s attack at Garissa 
University that killed 147 students earlier this year, U.S. administration officials claimed 
the act was out of desperation and further evidence of the group in its last death throes.218 
However, Al-Shabaab’s lethality demonstrates how challenging it is to destroy terrorist 
groups through leadership targeting, despite the ranks of its leadership attrited by 
intelligence-led airstrikes. The ability to conduct high-profile, sophisticated external 
terrorist attacks then, are a manifestation of the group’s resilience, bolstered by its 
structural adaptations. Terrorist groups that adapt structural changes make it more 
difficult to destabilize through leadership targeting. In this section, I describe two 
structural adaptations Al-Shabaab undertook that increased its resilience against 
leadership targeting, decentralization and bureaucratization. These adaptations make 
many terrorist groups like Al-Shabaab exceedingly resilient to leadership targeting.219 
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1. How Decentralization Increases Group Resilience 
Terrorist groups that attempt to overthrow a state need to grow to be successful. 
They also need to recruit, train, and equip members to grow. One way to deal with 
successful growth of the organization is to decentralize, by “pushing down operational 
decision-making into the lower levels of the organization.”220 Some terrorist 
organizations remain hierarchical at the upper levels, while decentralizing command and 
control at the operational level.221 This quasi-bureaucratic structure accommodates the 
existence of both vertical decision-making hierarchies and horizontal networks that carry 
out the organization’s most dangerous activities.222 Al-Shabaab organizes along a similar 
structure, with a strong centralized command and decentralized operational 
capabilities.223 As Al-Shabaab expanded and gained territorial control, the leadership 
made explicit decentralization efforts to empower regional commanders and ensure 
operations would continue in the face of leadership targeting operations.  
Starting around 2011, as leadership targeting and conventional military pressure 
against the group intensified, Al-Shabaab began to exhibit structural changes required to 
transition to an asymmetrical warfare strategy.224 With its lines of communication under 
pressure and its leadership constantly surveilled by intelligence agencies, Godane 
decentralized authority within Al-Shabaab, delegating operational authority to regional 
governors.225 Decentralizing command and control empowered local leaders and 
commanders to plan and conduct operations, raise revenues, and—where Al-Shabaab still 
controls territory—to administer populations under their control.226 As the group 
                                                 
220 Freeman, “A Theory of Terrorist Leadership,” 670. 
221 Jordan, “Attacking the Leader,” 15. 
222 Michael Kenney, From Pablo to Osama: Counter-Terrorism Lessons from the War on Drugs, 
Survival, Vol. 45, no. 3, (Autumn 2003), 187. 
223 Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, Report S/2013/414, 50. 
224 Abdulkader Sinno, Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond, Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2008, 11–19. The author elucidates why groups undergo structural changes depending on 
pressures by the state. While I did not consult this source beforehand, it is an indispensable theory for 
understanding adaptations of insurgent or terrorist groups.  
225 Bryden, Decline and Fall of Al-Shabaab, 7. 
226 Ibid., 2. 
 55 
matured, regional leadership grew in importance, and operational and ideological 
guidance was maintained at lower levels. Al-Shabaab’s military formations were also 
organized along parallel regional governorates. This decentralized arrangement is well 
suited to Al-Shabaab’s military strategy of guerrilla warfare, by distributing resource 
burdens to the local level.227 Decentralizing authority also helped offset the command 
and control issues the group faced with loss of territory and the requirement to operate 
clandestinely. As a result, Al-Shabaab’s ability to effectively carry out operations became 
more dependent on its junior leaders and foot soldiers, rather than the Emir.228 
If leadership targeting operations only aim at top-tier leadership, there is little 
reason to believe its operational capability will be degraded, given this decentralization of 
operational command. There is evidence that key regional commanders are the main 
drivers of Al-Shabaab’s external activities including the high casualty attacks at Westgate 
and Garissa University in 2013 and 2015, respectively.229 Subsequently U.S. airstrikes 
have not focused on these operational level leaders, until very recently.230 As a result, 
disruptions to Al-Shabaab’s core leadership have had little impact on Al-Shabaab’s 
operational capability.231  Al-Shabaab’s decentralized command structure also meant that 
a successful strike against a senior leader did not necessarily impact its operations 
elsewhere. This is particularly true in Mogadishu by evidenced by Al-Shabaab’s 
uninterrupted assassination and suicide campaigns against the central government. One 
further adaptation demonstrates Al-Shabaab’s resilience to leadership targeting. Al-
Shabaab has organized several affiliates from its bordering neighbors, namely, Al-Hijra 
based in Kenya. Al-Hijra is responsible for the majority of terrorist attacks against 
civilians, and signals Al-Shabaab’s further penetration into East Africa. Al-Shabaab is 
able to externally recruit, install support networks, and radicalize non-Somali Muslims 
attracted to their cause. Furthermore, the merger of Al-Hijra with Al-Shabaab signals its 
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non-Somali elements are an important change in becoming a genuine transnational 
terrorist organization. 
2. How Bureaucratization Increases Group Resilience 
Another way terrorist organizations deal with growth is by bureaucratizing its 
organizational functions.232 Terrorist groups that bureaucratize have clear divisions of 
managerial responsibilities and operational functions, and are more likely to recover from 
a sudden loss of leadership.233 Additionally, many terrorist groups organize with a central 
authority that is composed of multiple individuals, none being singularly important.234 In 
addition to its central authority and decentralized structure, Al-Shabaab is organized 
along functional and regional operational commands, which contribute to its stability.  
Newer terrorist groups are more susceptible to leadership decapitation. “Since 
smaller, younger, and more ideological organizations are less likely to be bureaucratized, 
they are more likely to succumb to attacks on their leadership.”235 This was evident in the 
United States’ early targeting of Al-Shabaab’s leadership, whereby leadership strikes had 
a devastating impact on the group—effectively disrupting command and control and 
demoralizing fighters.236 As terrorist organizations become larger, they specialize and 
develop diversified functions that increase their stability.237 Additionally, “bureaucracies 
enhance their organizational stability and efficiency through diversification, making them 
more resilient to leadership attacks.”238 Expanding and differentiating helps Al-Shabaab 
become more resilient in the face of leadership loss, by creating dependable and 
segregated sources of support. After surviving the initial flurry of leadership targeting 
efforts, Al-Shabaab recovered and began establishing local governance structures, as it 
regained control of Southern Somalia. Al-Shabaab bureaucratized by forming function 
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specific divisions that oversaw governance, finance, ideology, intelligence, and media 
operations.239 Early in Al-Shabaab’s trajectory, clear roles and responsibilities were 
delegated. For example, Al-Shabaab’s ministry for religious affairs was responsible for 
spreading its own brand of Islam, standardizing and routinizing its radical ideology. In 
this way, ideology is routinized and results in a bureaucratic form of authority.240 In 
addition, Al-Shabaab’s spokesperson, for example, speaks on behalf of the organization 
through the Internet, press statements, and interviews to the international media.241  The 
existence of distinct political, military and ideological units within a terrorist organization 
can signal that it has matured and is able to carry out separate and specific organizational 
functions, such as offering social services or administering legal justice.242 Like a 
maturing terrorist organization, Al-Shabaab’s decentralized governorates have functional 
ministries of social affairs and Sharia courts that implements social justice. 
Terrorist groups that display bureaucratic characteristics (decentralized authority 
and diversified organizational functions) are able to recover from disruptions to 
leadership.243 For example, if a formal succession process exits, the sudden death or 
capture of a leader should be less disruptive to the group. As discussed above, within a 
week of Godane’s death, Al-Shabaab had announced a new successor, one that was pre-
arranged and agreed upon by the Shura council.244 U.S. leadership targeting efforts, 
predicted a fracturing of Al-Shabaab into nationalist and global jihadist wings, but 
underestimated the level of bureaucratic decision-making within the group that allowed it 
to survive a breakup. Al-Shabaab’s current Emir has also adopted the group’s devolved 
system of command and control, which has helped prevent it from splintering after 
Godane’s death.245 Al-Shabaab’s maturation is also marked by the continued cultivation 
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of younger leaders, all steeped in Al-Shabaab’s ideological creed and military doctrine, 
capable of replenishing losses from its upper echelons.246 
 WHY LEADERSHIP DECAPITATION IS UNLIKELY TO WORK 
This chapter analyzed theoretical explanations of terrorist leadership and 
structural adaptations to explain why Al-Shabaab has developed a resiliency to leadership 
targeting. Like the internal dissentions that preceded Godane’s death and subsequent 
targeting of senior leadership, little overall impact has been made against the operational 
capability of Al-Shabaab. This is because the important of top-tier leadership importance 
both operationally and inspirationally has declined as Al-Shabaab has matured as an 
organization. Through its maturity and growth, Al-Shabaab has become resilient through 
collective leadership bodies, decentralized operational capabilities, and an independent 
mechanism to achieve its local and regional objectives. Al-Shabaab’s decentralized 
operations, ideological routinization and its bureaucratic specialization have shielded the 
group from disruption by leadership targeting operations. Leadership targeting has forced 
these adaptations to some degree, and Al-Shabaab’s decentralization is not without risk. 
One consequence of further decentralization is the group adapting into an increasingly 
multi-polar organization, with a large number of autonomous subgroups, making Al-
Shabaab even more dispersed and unpredictable.247 In spite of the risks, Al-Shabaab 
continues to operate freely across much of southern Somalia, harassing AMISOM forces 
and maintaining a steady rhythm of assassinations, bombings, and complex attacks 
against Somali authorities. 
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V. WHO SHOULD BE KILLED TO DEFEAT AL-SHABAAB? 
If the only tool you have is a hammer, you tend to see every problem as a 
nail. 
—Abraham Maslow 
 
The United States faces significant challenges in defeating Al-Shabaab in 
Somalia. While the United States’ leadership targeting strategy has been successful by its 
own standards of measurement, it does not provide a clear picture of Al-Shabaab’s 
capability. Though airstrikes have eliminated most of the founding members of the group, 
Al-Shabaab is now as active as ever and has evolved into a transnational terrorist 
organization. The group continues to operate freely across much of Southern Somalia 
capable of destabilizing Somali’s peacekeeping force. Few think that Al-Shabaab can be 
defeated through military means alone, yet the United States continues to rely on a 
strategy of limited airstrikes to fight Al-Shabaab. Given the lack of strategic success, the 
United States should modify its policy to account for the conditions within Somalia. In 
this chapter, I suggest how the United States should refine its leadership targeting 
strategy to effectively disrupt and degrade Al-Shabaab as a terrorist organization.  
My concluding analysis highlights four main issues. First, the United States’ 
strategy overestimates the effects of lethal targeting by focusing on symbolically 
important top-tier leaders. Second, the preference for capture remains largely theoretical 
and undermines the utility of intelligence-based counterterrorism operations. Third, 
leadership targeting is rarely synchronized with a broader strategy that can capitalize on 
gains in both leadership targeting and conventional military operations. Last, this tactic in 
its lethal form exacerbates a fundamental problem of dismantling terrorist organizations: 
killing leaders prevents gaining a deep understanding of Al-Shabaab’s internal dynamics.  
 TARGETING OPERATIONAL-LEVEL LEADERS 
The United States has narrowly focused on decapitating Al-Shabaab leaders to the 
detriment of its overall strategy. While some decisions are based on politics and policy, 
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leadership targeting is largely based on a premise that leaders are responsible for the 
capability of the organization. This approach overlooks the importance of operational 
level leadership.248 Al-Shabaab’s most lethal unit, the Amniyat, is responsible for much 
of the external terrorist operations throughout East Africa and arguably more 
operationally important to than top-tier leaders. Until very recently, operational 
leadership has not been the focus of its targeting operations.  
The United States must broaden its targeting strategy to include mid-tier and 
operational level leaders who actually organize and lead terrorist attacks. In practical 
terms, targeting Al-Shabaab’s chief of external operations could be more effective than 
targeting top leadership, because he is capable of executing terrorist attacks throughout 
the region, and because of the effective assassination campaigns against government 
officials. Instead of trying to destroy the group, the United States must destroy the 
group’s capability to destabilize Somalia and must disrupt and prevent external terrorist 
threats. 
 EMPHASIZING CAPTURE OVER KILL 
Al-Shabaab’s leaders have been targeted primarily with airstrikes with little 
interest in retrieving their intelligence. The United States’ predisposition for lethal 
targeting hinders the ability to illuminate the group’s leadership network, to interfere with 
its operational plans, and to disrupt its terror attacks. Furthermore, the use of the tactic 
forfeits the chance to better understand Al-Shabaab’s internal workings, including 
strategy, decision-making, and leadership dynamics. All are potentially valuable in 
disrupting and weakening Al-Shabaab. In addition, leadership decapitation often only 
leads to short-term gains and does not provide the information required to counter the 
group’s future plans. 
U.S. leadership targeting should focus on the pursuit and capture of both top-tier 
and mid-level leaders to disrupt operations, weaken capability, and remove operationally 
minded leadership. Within a span of four months in 2014, the United States has 
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successfully eliminated four top leaders from the Amniyat, who were responsible for 
external operations and assassinations. This feat stemmed from the capture of the 
Amniyat’s first intelligence chief, who provided intelligence on the group.249 As 
described previously, the capture and interrogation of Al-Shabaab’s mid-level leaders 
yielded valuable intelligence, revealing the inner workings of both Al-Shabaab and 
AQAP.250 The United States needs to deliberately weigh the costs associated with 
capture operations versus those associated with the forfeiture of intelligence in lethal 
operations. Furthermore, the United States should be prepared to assume greater risk in 
order to fully exploit intelligence from Al-Shabaab’s leaders. According to the CIA 
Director John Brennan, intelligence disrupts terrorist plots, thwarts attacks, and saves 
lives.251 If intelligence is valuable enough to prevent the loss of life, surely it is worth 
taking some measure of risk to obtain it. 
 INTEGRATING LEADERSHIP TARGETING WITH A BROADER 
MILITARY STRATEGY  
Leadership targeting is a necessary component of the strategy to counter Al-
Shabaab, but it is not sufficient on its own. Moreover, this targeting approach has been 
executed in isolation of conventional military operations. Militarily, neither the United 
States nor its proxy forces have been able to strategically exploit gains in each other’s 
operations. Despite being a larger military force with better weapons and international 
backing, AMISOM and the SNA are neither organized nor equipped to fight an 
asymmetric war that could defeat Al-Shabaab.252 Government forces are often 
overstretched, under supplied, and out maneuvered by the more agile guerrilla force of 
Al-Shabaab. The loss of territory is another metric that has been used as an indicator of 
success against Al-Shabaab. Yet it seems to matter little, since Al-Shabaab elected to 
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cede territory, and adopt a guerrilla strategy to slowly exhaust AMISOM and SNA 
forces.  
Recent AMISOM offensives have offered an opportunity to significantly disrupt 
and degrade Al-Shabaab’s capability. A steady pressure on Al-Shabaab’s leadership 
while they are forced from territory could disrupt ongoing operations. Achieving this 
objective requires that leadership targeting operations to be integrated in a broad strategy 
that exploits military gains while denying Al-Shabaab the opportunity to retreat and 
reorganize. Forcing Al-Shabaab leaders to stay mobile also presents further opportunities 
to gather more consistent intelligence for further targeting opportunities. 
Somalia’s counterterrorism forces should be integrated into leadership targeting 
operations and be provided the intelligence and resources to capture or kill Al-Shabaab’s 
operational level leaders. So far, the U.S. trained Somali Commando units have been 
used primarily as a quick reaction force and as a personal security force to Somalia’s 
leaders. Furthermore, the tactic of leadership targeting will not tip the scales in favor of 
the United States and its allies unless strikes are coupled with ground operations and 
unless resources and intelligence are shared with host-nation forces. The United States’ 
efforts should focus on developing intelligence through capturing Al-Shabaab’s terrorist 
leadership to continually drive the intelligence cycle and affect future leadership targeting 
opportunities. 
 LEADERSHIP TARGETING BASED UPON KNOWLEDGE OF GROUP 
DYNAMICS  
Despite the success of eliminating Al-Shabaab’s leadership, the U.S. policy has 
been marked by a myopic focus on leadership decapitation, an emphasis on intelligence 
focused on pattern of life or communication preferences, and unilateral targeting 
campaigns. This flawed strategy has inadvertently strengthened the position of Al-
Shabaab, resulted in in a limited understanding of how the group operates, and has 
resulted in a decentralized and more autonomous group that is resilient to leadership 
targeting.253  
                                                 
253 Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, Report S/2015/801Report S/2015/801, 17. 
 63 
Historically, Al-Shabaab has operated with a heterogeneous leadership core, 
representing diverse interests and ideologies. Internal disagreements have existed since 
the group’s formation. Moreover, divisions and rivalries have been exposed as the group 
experienced pressure and setbacks. Likewise, the period of greatest vulnerability occurred 
when Al-Shabaab consolidated power and underwent a leadership purge. In short, the 
Emir orchestrated the deaths of former allies, expelled moderate leaders, consolidated 
power, and weakened its ideological appeal. Yet, the United States failed to capitalize on 
the period of Al-Shabaab’s greatest vulnerability since the group’s formation. Therefore, 
the United States should focus on exploiting divisions within Al-Shabaab, particularly 
when internal divisions are strongest. Al-Shabaab’s former leadership struggles 
demonstrate how disruptive leadership disputes could be to terrorist organizations, and 
should be manipulated to weaken the group. If properly understood, the United States 
should target these divisions to further fracture the group, and improve the likelihood of 
triggering the group’s eventual decline.  
The United States has not effectively co-opted potential moderates within Somalia 
to undermine the influence of Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab has many well publicized internal 
divisions between more militant, radical leaders and those more politically minded. The 
United States has failed to exploit openings to “target” potential moderates for defection. 
The United States missed an opportunity to work with Hassan Aweys, an influential 
leader who offered to collaborate with the United States against Al-Shabaab. Aweys 
eventually became Al-Shabaab’s spiritual leader, was influential in developing Al-
Shabaab’s religious appeal, and could have been used to counter the group’s Al-Qaeda 
inspired ideology. Another example of working with moderates is the cooperation with 
Ahmed Madobe. Madobe is the current President of Jubaland, a regional government in 
Southern Somalia. He was once a high-value terrorist target to the United States, and 
narrowly survived a U.S. airstrike in 2007. Madobe was one of the most radical leaders of 
Al-Shabaab’s nationalist faction, but later abandoned his loyalty to Al-Shabaab to 
become Kenya’s preferred ally in Somalia. The United States should target moderate 
Islamists within Al-Shabaab for defection and factionalization. Additionally, the United 
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States should focus on protecting moderates who are amenable to politicization and 
negotiation. 
Capitalizing on leadership divisions and protecting potential moderates should be 
part of the broader effort of leadership targeting against Al-Shabaab. Furthermore, a deep 
appreciation of the group’s internal workings would lead to better decisions regarding 
who should be captured, who should be lethally targeted, and how divisions and factions 
within the leadership could be exploited. The United States would benefit from gaining a 
deeper understanding of the group’s leadership dynamics, and better cultural intelligence 
will lead to better targeting decisions.  
 PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS 
To truly disrupt and degrade Al-Shabaab, the United States must fundamentally 
change its targeting approach. Leadership targeting is a powerful tactic in countering 
terrorist groups, if only a narrow one. The United States must take a more analytical 
approach to counter the terrorist threat and stabilize Somalia, weighing its benefits and 
consequences. As terrorist groups evolve from localized networks into transnational 
threats, the United States must implement a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy not 
only to disrupt and weaken their capability, but to undermine, and isolate their baleful 
appeal. The Unites States’ focus on top-tier leadership has led to isolated successes, yet 
long-term objectives have remained elusive. In this thesis, I advocate for the limited use 
of leadership decapitation, rather exploiting existing divisions and vulnerabilities to 
undermine, isolate and weaken terrorist leadership. I also have argued that a myopic 
focus on top-tier leadership has undermined the focus on important operational 
leadership, and the United States should broaden the focus and means of leadership 
targeting. Finally, I implore the advocates of leadership targeting to gain of deep 
understanding of terrorist groups in order to develop leadership targeting strategies that 
not only precipitate the decline of Al-Shabaab in the short-term, but contributes to long-
term strategic success. 
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